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This dissertation offers a philosophical analysis of the ecological crisis through the lens 
of Hannah Arendt. It frames the ecological crisis as a struggle for situated cohabitation. By 
analyzing the work of Arendt, this dissertation shows the ways in which the ecological crisis is 
entwined with the political crisis of plurality. I suggest that these two issues are interconnected 
and that we need to address both for situated cohabitation. This dissertation is an 
interdisciplinary work, drawing from environmental philosophy, feminist philosophy, and 
educational practice. The work is intended to provide novel insight into the current ecological 
crisis in three ways. First, it grounds its theory in the work of Arendt, a thinker not usually 
situated in the prevue of environmental scholarship. Second, by synthesizing Arendt’s account of 
plurality with the work of Judith Butler and Ricardo Rozzi, this dissertation explores a politics of 
plurality that can take account of social and ecological conditions of plurality. Third and finally, 
the dissertation merges theory with praxis by offering a practical program for doing 
environmental philosophy with children, a program derived from my sustained experiences 
working as a facilitator of a philosophy for children (P4C) program. This dissertation does not 
seek just a theoretical understanding of the ecological crisis, but also a practice of situated 
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1.1 Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation offers a philosophical analysis of the ecological crisis through the lens 
of the great political thinker, Hannah Arendt. It frames the ecological crisis as a struggle for 
situated cohabitation. By anchoring down in the work of Arendt, this dissertation shows the ways 
in which the ecological crisis is entwined with the political crisis of plurality. I suggest that these 
two issues are interconnected and that we need to address both for situated cohabitation.  
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary work, drawing from environmental philosophy, 
feminist philosophy, and educational practice. The work is intended to provide novel insight into 
the current ecological crisis in three ways. First, it grounds its theory in the work of Arendt, a 
thinker not usually situated in the prevue of environmental scholarship. Second, by grounding in 
Arendt’s account of plurality, this dissertation explores a politics of plurality that can take 
account of the other-than human world. Third and finally, the dissertation merges theory with 
praxis by offering a practical program for doing environmental philosophy with children, a 
program derived from my sustained experiences working as a facilitator of a philosophy for 
children (P4C) program. This dissertation does not seek just a theoretical understanding of the 
ecological crisis, but also a practice of situated cohabitation in the crisis.   
1.2 Leaving the Earth 
“I love having visitors!” exclaims a personified illustration of Mars on a NASA 
educational website for children.1 Regardless of whether Mars actually wants to have visitors, 
we can at least recognize NASA’s intention of encouraging children to be interested in and 
 
1 “Space Place: Explore Earth and Space!” NASA, accessed December 22, 2018, https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/all-
about-mars/en/. 
2 
possibly educated about Mars and other planets’ exploration. This idea of leaving the earth may 
no longer be a matter of dream-like science-fiction. For example, the SpaceX corporation 
announced its intention to build a spaceship capable of taking colonists to Mars as early as 
2024.2 SpaceX’s founder, Elon Musk, has suggested that colonization of Mars will be necessary 
in case the earth ever becomes uninhabitable.3 Likewise, movies like Interstellar (2014) 
increasingly promote the narrative that humanity must find another earthly planet, because we 
are at risk due to increasingly uninhabitable conditions of the earth. 
I recall a conversation I had with one of the children who was a student at a field 
environmental philosophy school in Massachusetts on our way back from a gorgeous hike. The 
boy expressed his serious concern about overpopulation. He suggested, with sincerity but not 
excitement, that we need to colonize other planets for the expansion of human habitats, since the 
earth is getting crowded. This conversation struck me as important and encouraged me to 
philosophically engage with the significance of it. What does it mean for a child to say that space 
colonization is a key for the future in the midst of ecological crisis? This is one of the starting 
points for my journey in this dissertation. 
Hannah Arendt begins her book The Human Condition (1958) by reflecting on the event 
of the first launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik, “an earth-born object” into outer space in 
1957.4 According to Arendt, the event, which was “second in importance to no other, not even to 
 
2 Kenneth Chang, “Elon Musk’s Plan: Get Humans to Mars, and Beyond,” New York Times, September 27, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/science/elon-musk-spacex-mars-exploration.html. 
3 Ian Stoner, “Human Should Not Colonize Mars,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3, no. 3 
(2017): 339. See also Kelsey Piper, “The Case Against Colonizing Space to Save Humanity,” Vox, October 22, 
2018, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/17991736/jeff-bezos-elon-musk-colonizing-mars-moon-
space-blue-origin-spacex. 
4 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 2nd ed., with an introduction by Margaret Canovan (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 1.  
3 
the splitting of the atom,”5 was called by an American reporter a “step toward escape from men’s 
imprisonment to the earth.”6 Arendt says that although the reporter’s statement might have 
seemed banal, we should not “overlook how extraordinary in fact it was.”7 For Arendt, the 
American reporter’s comment symbolizes the contradictory understanding of the human 
conditions in modernity in which we act as if we are like “dwellers of the universe,” even though 
we are always already “earth-bound creatures.”8 Although the child with whom I had the 
conversation was not excited like the American reporter Arendt describes, I also consider that the 
child’s thought should not be disregarded. It is possible that the conversation could simply be a 
product of the space-exploration era sixty years after Sputnik; however, I could not forget the 
sincerity of the child stating his concerns. Arendt’s thought may help us to see how this willful 
detachment from the earth is linked with the ecological crisis.  
Thus, in this dissertation, I question the meaning of living with others in the time of 
ecological crisis. I primarily converse with Arendt, a scholar who put plurality at the very heart 
of her political theory. However, because Arendt’s analysis alone is not sufficient for a full 
ecological and pluralist critique of contemporary society, this dissertation will also synthesize 
Arendt’s theory with the work of Judith Butler and Ricardo Rozzi, who add sociopolitical and 
ecological dimensions to our analysis of situated cohabitation.  
1.3 Ecological Crisis 
As we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, questions of environmental 
sustainability are increasingly urgent. Environmental issues, such as climate change, rapid 
 
5 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 1. 
6 Ibid., p. 1. 
7 Ibid., p. 2. 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
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degradation of biodiversity,9 and the loss of habitats,10 are a threat to earthly life. According to 
the 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), anthropogenic 
global warming will cause an increase in drought, heatwaves, and loss of biodiversity, even if 
global warming is limited to a 1.5 °C increase above pre-industrial times.11 To choose just one 
example, warm-water coral reefs are vital habitats and sustenance for many coinhabitants, 
including human populations.12 The IPCC report says that “even achieving emissions reduction 
targets consistent with the ambitious goal of 1.5 °C of global warming under the Paris 
Agreement will result in the further loss of 70–90% of reef-building corals compared to today, 
with 99% of corals being lost under warming of 2 °C or more above the pre-industrial 
period . . . .”13 Similarly dire prognoses are on offer for many other ecosystems. This is a crisis 
of the conditions of earthly life—the destruction of many ecosystems and the loss of species are 
irreversible. The term ecology is derived from the ancient Greek word oikos, which has a 
meaning of home in English. In this sense, this is an ecological crisis, because our shared 
home—the conditions of earthly life, is at risk. 
 
9 According to the 2019 report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES), 1 million species (including both animal and plant) are facing extinction due to human-driven 
causes within decades, unless such course of actions will be altered significantly. See IPBES, Summary for 
Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, eds. Sandra Díaz et al. (Bonn, Germany: IPBES 
secretariat, 2019), pp. 11–12. 
10 For example, the Global Wetland Outlook report by the Rasmar Convention (2018) reports that the loss of 
wetlands recorded 35 % since 1970, which rate is three time more than the loss of forests. See Rasmar Convention 
on Wetlands, Global Wetland Outlook: State of the World’s Wetlands and Their Services to People (Gland, 
Switzerland: Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2018), pp. 2, 5, 19. The report is available at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b256c78e17ba335ea89fe1f/t/5b9ffd2e0e2e7277f629eb8f/1537211739585/R
AMSAR+GWO_ENGLISH_WEB.pdf. 
11 Ove Hoegh-Guldberg et al., “Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems,” in Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels 
and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to 
the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty, eds. Valérie Masson-
Delmotte et al. In Press. (2018). 
12 IPBES, “Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of 
the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services,”  p. 11. 
13 Hoegh-Guldberg et al., “Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems,” p. 229. 
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This ecological crisis, in which humans are making our only home uninhabitable for 
many species, has been highlighted with a newly coined geological term, the Anthropocene.14 
The Anthropocene signifies that human activities have become the dominant force for the course 
of nature, or in more direct language, that there is “a single species in charge of the planet, 
altering its features almost at will.”15 However, although these drastic impacts are both directly 
and indirectly caused by anthropogenic drivers, it is highly questionable whether these changes 
are precisely at “our” will. Whose will? Do we really understand what we are doing? After all, 
the global wealthy are responsible for the vast majority of the destructive impacts precipitating 
the ecological crisis. Our situation is not the work of some abstract “anthropos,” but rather a 
specific cultural or way of being in the world, a way that Arendt does so much to describe and 
critique.  
What does it mean to make our planet less and less habitable for many species (including 
us) which are earth-bound creatures, like Arendt describes? This dissertation explores these 
questions through conversing with Arendt, who perceives “crisis” as a critical moment of 
judgment.16  
1.4 The Summary of Chapters 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I discuss how Arendt’s 
theory is relevant for the analysis of ecological crisis. I first review the debate of 
anthropocentrism in environmental ethics. I outline some issues arising from such debate, 
 
14 Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature 415, no. 23 (2002): 23.  
15 Fred Pearce, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change (Boston: Bacon 
Press, 2007), p. 58. 
16 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, with an introduction by Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 171. In Chapter 2, I will discuss more in detail on how Arendt perceives 
crisis.  
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clarifying how Arendt can contribute to environmental philosophical discussions despite of her 
anthropocentrism. I lastly review existing literature of environmental scholarship that primarily 
uses Arendt’s theory to show where this dissertation is situated and what it can offer to the 
scholarly field.  
Then, in Chapter 3, I primarily examine Arendt’s book The Human Condition (1958), in 
order to clarify how her political theory contributes to the dissertation. In particular, I review her 
analysis of the vita activa, her critique of modernity, and her analysis of earth alienation and 
world alienation. Through this analysis, I show Arendt’s account of human plurality, which 
necessitates both earthly and worldly living. I argue that the link between earth and world 
alienation is vital to understanding and addressing the ecological crisis. 
In Chapter 4, I aim to expand the ecological reading of Arendt through the work of Judith 
Butler and Ricardo Rozzi, in order to address the social and ecological conditions of plurality. I 
first introduce Butler’s critique of Arendt, through which Butler develops the conditions of 
precariousness and interdependency as fundamental political concerns, as we are embodied 
beings. In conversation with Arendt’s concept of the crime against humanity, Butler proposes the 
ethics of unchosen cohabitation, which signifies that our human plurality mandates us to not 
choose whom to cohabit in the earth. I then add Rozzi’s analysis of biocultural ethics, which 
shows the interconnected link among habits, habitats, and co-inhabitants. I use Rozzi’s 
biocultural framework to argue why the world phenomenon of rapid extinction of species and 
loss of biocultural diversity (including linguistic diversity) can be understood as not only a crime 
against humanity, but also a crime against the earth, if we can come to understand that earthly 
inhabitance comes with the condition of innumerous interdependency. Through examining 
examples of ecocide, I show the important links between crimes against humanity and crimes 
7 
against the earth, and attempt to show the importance of considering crimes against the earth in 
themselves. 
In Chapter 5, I introduce an educational practice of situated cohabitation. I first briefly 
discuss how education and children are relevant to the question of situated cohabitation through 
conversing with Arendt. The main part of the chapter was previously published as a book chapter 
in the book Growing Up With Philosophy Camp (2020), and the book chapter was cowritten with 
Benn Johnson.17 In the chapter, Johnson and I introduce an Environmental Philosophy with 
Children (EPWC) summer camp, which was co-developed with the other chapters of this 
dissertation in mind. Pulling away from direct analysis of texts, this chapter argues from 
firsthand accounts at the EPWC camp that cultivating a sense of plurality in community should 
be inseparable from cultivating a sense of place, in order to bring about a caring situated 
cohabitation. 
In my conversations with Arendt and other scholars, I have learned more about how to 
care for our common world. In this dissertation, I hope to show that the care for the world needs 
to come with the care for the earth. Although the ecological readings of Arendt are still rare, I 
hope that this dissertation can be a helpful bridge between the scholarship of Arendt and that of 
the ecological crisis.    
 
 
17 Rika Tsuji and Benn Johnson, “Philosophy Meets Place: Creating an Environmental Philosophy Summer Camp,” 
in Growing Up with Philosophy Camp: How Learning to Think Develops Friendship, Community, and a Sense of 




2.1 Why Hannah Arendt?  
Almost a half century after her death, the works of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) have not 
lost their relevance.18 This may be because we still live in difficult times; crises, as Arendt 
describes them, are important turning points in which people need to make a judgment.19 Arendt 
understands the word crisis as in the Greek word krinein, which includes the meaning of “to 
decide.”20 A crisis is not simply any decision-making but is a moment where one faces the 
possibility of disaster without a right judgment. Arendt, thus, does not frame “crisis” as a 
desperate condition. She rather sees it as an opportunity, which “forces us back to the questions 
themselves and requires from us either new or old answers, but in any case direct judgments.”21 
Arguably, much of her work is comprised of her engagements with crises of her time, or “dark 
times” as she describes them.22 Some of the crises she discusses certainly remain in our time. 
Among those, the crises of world and earth alienation are a concern of this dissertation. I argue 
that the link between earth and world alienation is vital in understanding and addressing the 
ecological crisis. This dissertation is situated within the broader discourse of critical 
environmental scholarship, and it attempts to examine the ecological crisis through philosophical 
 
18 See, for instance, Richard J. Bernstein, Why Read Hannah Arendt Now? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018). 
19 Jerome Kohn, Introduction to Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, by Hannah Arendt 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1998), p. xviii 
20 Daivd L. Marshall, “The Origin and Character of Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Judgment,” Political Theory 38, no. 
3 (2010): 370; Jakob Norberg, “Arendt in Crisis: Political Thought in Between Past and Future,” College Literature 
38, no. 1 (2011): 140.  
21 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 171.  
22 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. vii–x. 
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analysis in conversation with and against Arendt.23 
Before we examine her analysis of earth and world alienation in Chapter 3, it is important 
to discuss how Arendt’s work can be relevant to the analysis of ecological crisis. After all, at first 
glance, it would appear that Arendt is not a part of critical environmental scholarship. Most of 
her work concerns the sustenance of our human world rather than the natural environment and 
emphasizes the differences rather than similarities between human and nonhuman animals.24 
Because of this binary between humans and nature, some scholars may consider her work as 
insufficient to use for scholarly work on environmental issues. However, Bonnie Honig offers 
two different scholarly approaches that she has observed in the feminist’s analysis of Arendt’s 
work, categorizing “Woman Question in Arendt” and “Arendt Question in Feminism.”25 
Although her examples are specifically about feminist theory, her analogies are helpful for us to 
understand the case of environmental literature as well. Honig explains that the former, “Women 
Question in Arendt,” is an approach that aims to examine how Arendt understands women in her 
theory and “sets a standard that Arendt can only pass or fail.”26 The former, thus, seems to test 
whether Arendt is feminist enough or not, as in similar questions about whether Plato is a 
feminist or not.27 On the other hand, Honig points out that the latter examines what Arendt’s 
theory, if any, can offer to feminist theory; that is, feminist theory itself meets the work of 
 
23 I particularly withdrawn of the reading of Arendt “with and against” from Bonnie Honig: Bonnie Honig, 
“Introduction: The Arendt Question in Feminism,” in Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, ed. Bonnie Honig 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 2–4.  
24 I discuss this more in Chapter 3, but her project in The Human Condition primarily concerns how the Western 
political theories have undermined our condition of worldly existence. Her understanding of the human condition 
relies on the boundaries of different realms, such as the earth and world, and our binding activities in each realm, 
such as labor, work, and action. 
25 Honig, “Introduction,” p. 3. 
26 Ibid.  
27 See, for instance, Lynda Lange, “The Function of Equal Representation in Plato’s Republic,” in The Sexism of 
Social and Political Theory: Women and Reduction from Plato and Nietzsche, eds. Lorenne M.G. Clark and Lynda 
Lange, 3–15 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).  
10 
Arendt for further critical perspectives, including critical examination of feminist theory itself. 
This second approach does not, of course, mean blind acceptance, but it does mean open-
mindedness or, as Arendt might say with her focus on natality, an openness to new beginnings. 
Likewise, although Arendt does not address environmental destruction or the ecological 
crisis as an environmental scholar, her work, such as The Human Condition, examines the ways 
in which we engage in our world and the earth through our activities, the vita activa, and 
arguably offers critical insight into the ecological crisis. We can use Honig’s second approach 
not only for considering Arendt and feminism, but also Arendt’s possible contributions to 
environmental philosophy. Moreover, as seen in Judith Butler’s attempt to explore more 
inclusive political theory through the work of Arendt, a critical reading of Arendt can offer 
important insights into the question of how we can live together in these difficult times.28 Thus, 
my attempt is not so much to prove whether Arendt is an environmental philosopher per se, but 
rather to think with and against Arendt; what she may offer to our understanding of the crisis. 
2.2 Philosophizing Ecological Crisis: Overcoming Anthropocentrism 
Before exploring what Arendt may offer to discourse about ecological crisis, we need to 
review some relevant work of environmental philosophy to show why anthropocentrism became 
problematized as a root cause of ecological crisis, and we need to address some of the important 
problems arising from such analysis.29 This literature review helps us to understand what has 
been discussed and see where Arendt’s work may be situated, especially considering that Arendt 
 
28 See Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2015). 
29 My survey of the literature is predominantly English-language writing and those which published in English 
speaking countries, as the discipline was established in the United States. To this extent, my literature review is not 
extensive enough to capture the whole discipline or discussions nor intended to do so due to the limited space and 
time. Likewise, I do not intend to deny the existence or significance of other regional or linguistic works in 
environmental philosophy.  
11 
embraced a form of anthropocentrism in her own work. 
Environmental ethics, as a distinct discipline, was established around the 1970s in the 
U.S..30 The advent of the academic discipline reflected an increase in environmental awareness 
of the time. The fact that we can characterize the current period as “ecological crisis” may 
unsurprisingly be a result of the collective thinking about our relationship with the environment. 
The nineteenth century onward has been an important period for the growth of environmental 
scholarly works and consciousness in the humanities in the U.S.31 Early environmental 
awareness was centered around the loss and preservation of wilderness areas, such as seen in the 
writings of Henry David Thoreau and John Muir. The first national park, Yellowstone, was 
established in 1872, and John Muir’s enthusiastic work on the preservation of wilderness areas 
not only successfully led to the establishment of Yosemite National Park in 1890, but also 
contributed to the popularization of the idea and experience of “wilderness” in the United 
States.32  
However, in the post-World War II era, the range of environmental consciousness was 
expanded from “wilderness” as pristine or special nature, to “the environment” as something 
more close to our daily lives, such as land, soil, water, air, and food. For example, Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) addressed the danger of using highly toxic synthetic pesticide 
DDT in agriculture, challenging the dominant view that sees DDT as a symbol of scientific 
 
30 For the detail information of the academic establishment of the field Environmental Ethics, see Roderick Frazier 
Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1989). See also Eugene Hargrove, “Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value,” The Monist 75, no. 2 (1992): 183. In 
which, Hargrove says “professional environmental ethics arose directly out of the interest in the environment created 
by Earth Day in 1970.” In this dissertation, I use the terms environmental ethics and environmental philosophy 
interchangeably when referring to an academic field.  
31 See Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982); Nash, The Rights of Nature. 
32 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, pp.102–3, 122–40. 
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triumph over the threats to humanity such as diseases and hunger.33 She revealed uncertainty in 
the absolute power of “postwar America,” which assumed that “science was god, and science 
was male.”34 Although her book is an environmental science book, she successfully incorporated 
metaphors in her writing, which enabled her to reach a wider audience and critically, creatively, 
and caringly challenged this dominant scientific discourse. A few years after Silent Spring was 
published, the first Earth Day (1970) was established, as well as the Environmental Protection 
Act, or EPA (1970). Carson’s work is undeniably influential in the establishment of these social 
changes.35 
While Carson’s work raised environmental awareness in society at large, Aldo Leopold’s 
“The Land Ethic” in A Sand County Almanac (1949) has widely been considered to be one of the 
earliest articulations of the need for an environmental ethic.36 The reason is, as Eugene Hargrove 
describes, “The Land Ethic” initiated a discussion that “environmental problems are ultimately 
philosophical in nature,” showing the link between ecological destruction and our conceptions of 
nature and land.37 In the chapter, Leopold critiques the failure of the existing moral theories to 
take account of ecology of the land and argues for the need of an ethic that does so otherwise.38 
Given that, he offers the land ethic, which requires two changes to morality; the first is to enlarge 
the existing moral community to include both biotic and abiotic entities, and the land; and the 
 
33 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 1962, 40th anniversary ed., with an introduction by Linda Lear (Boston: Mariner 
Books, 2002); Lisa Newton, The American Experience in Environmental Protection (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 
pp. 5–6. 
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second is to “change the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain 
member [of the land community].”39 This shift of the role of Homo sapiens in the land means 
that humans should not stand above the land, taking a god-like perspective to determine 
who/what counts as valuable or worthless in the land community, based solely on human self-
interests.40 That is, the land ethic challenges the assumption of the epistemic and ontological 
hierarchy in our current moral understanding against nonhuman nature. The land ethic comes 
with an epistemological and ontological shift in our perceptions and concepts of the moral 
community and its relationship for ethical transformation.  
What Leopold ignited is the long-term debate about anthropocentrism in the academic 
circle of environmental ethics.41 One of the catalysts for this debate was the indication that there 
was a link between human superiority and Western traditions. For example, Lynn White, Jr.’s 
“The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” explores the cause of ecological destruction in 
Judeo-Christian tradition, which he describes as “the most anthropocentric religion of the world,” 
that fosters a worldview in which humans are seen as dominators of nature.42 Richard Routley’s 
“Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?” later showed that existing Western ethical 
principles themselves are already anthropocentric, as the principles are based in “basic (human) 
chauvinism,” meaning satisfying a person’s interest is morally permissible as long as it does not 
harm other humans or oneself.43 For example, his famous thought experiment, the “last man” 
example, shows that under traditional, human-chauvinist Western ethics, it is morally 
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permissible for the hypothetical last man on the earth to destroy any living or non-living things 
as long as he wishes. Routley’s example portrayed that there was no axiological foundation for 
other-than-human entities to be valued intrinsically, and the existing axioms allowed humans to 
treat them only instrumentally, i.e., anthropocentrism. Thus, as Jeremy Sorgen describes, 
Routley’s work suggested the need for a new environmental ethic that can “break with the logic 
of anthropocentrism,”44 including “classical and religious humanism,”45 and that can be based on 
nonanthropocentric principles.46  
Thus, some environmental philosophers, particularly earlier ones, started exploring the 
possibility of such nonanthropocentric value in nature, i.e., intrinsic value. One of the problems 
in the logic of anthropocentrism is that other-than-human entities are seen as only instrumentally 
valuable, or that the values of these entities are derived from humans. For example, in “The 
Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary,” Arne Naess, a founder of 
deep ecology, contests the need of overcoming anthropocentric environmentalism, or shallow 
ecology, in which conservation of nature takes place for the sake of human well-being. Instead, 
Naess defends a biocentric approach, or deep ecology, which rejects anthropocentric, or “the 
man-in environment image” but asserts a biocentric egalitarianist worldview in which each 
species have “the equal right to live and blossom.”47  
Likewise, Paul Taylor developed a life-centered moral theory in which he defends the 
inherent worth of other-than-human entities due to the prima facie condition of “being members 
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of the Earth’s community of life” and intrinsic value of realizing their good.48 That is, the 
foundation of inherent worth for other-than-human entities is defended independently from 
human value judgments and perceptions. In Environmental Ethics, Holmes Rolston, III also 
explores nonanthropocentric objective value in nature, arguing that humans are not the producers 
of the value but the ecosystem of the Earth itself is the carrier of the value, as it is “able to 
produce the valued experience.”49 Rolston’s normative approach can be described as ecocentrism, 
which perceives not only the intrinsic value of other-than human entities but also that of 
ecosystems themselves.50  
However, J. Baird Callicott disagrees that there could be an “objective” account of the 
intrinsic value of nature. In In Defense of the Land Ethic, Callicott examines the Cartesian legacy 
of modern science’s dualistic assumption that nature, or physical material itself, should be 
strictly distinguished from human understanding. That is, nature is ahistorical and non-
axiological material, and any sensory experience and values concerning the material are derived 
from human understanding; there is no such a thing as value in things themselves, but only 
strictly for things themselves.51 To resonate with this scientific worldview, Callicott takes a 
subjectivist approach toward nonanthropocentric intrinsic value, arguing that valuing nature for 
itself, i.e., intrinsically, is possible without grounding intrinsic value in nature independently 
from our value judgements.52 This development of subjectivist nonanthropocentric intrinsic 
value invited another critique from Hargrove, who argues for a “weak anthropocentric” approach 
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toward the intrinsic value of nature, claiming, for example, that Callicott’s theory is not 
sufficiently nonanthropocentric, since the source of all values is seen to be humans.53  
Although this literature review on the debate of anthropocentrism does not cover the 
entire discussion, as you may notice, this debate “deep,” “subjective,” “objective,” 
“anthropocentric, “nonanthropocentric,” and “weak anthropocentric” intrinsic value of nature is 
confusing. Arguably, one of the reasons is in the term anthropocentrism itself. For example, 
Brian Norton says that this is partly because “a crucial ambiguity in the term anthropocentrism 
has gone unnoticed” by both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric camps. In his literary 
survey on anthropocentrism, Ben Mylius also points out that many scholars do not define the 
term anthropocentrism clearly, and even when defined, it tends to falsely “create the impression 
that anthropocentrism is exclusively, and inevitably, a matter of normative claims about human 
superiority.”54 As Norton and Mylius suggest, the term anthropocentrism itself has led to 
unnecessary confusion within the discipline.  
Mylius’s survey categorizes anthropocentrism into three different kinds, perceptual, 
descriptive, and normative anthropocentrism. According to Mylius, perceptual anthropocentrism 
describes the de facto epistemological condition of human embodiment that any sense-data is 
always already informed and received by a human body.55 Descriptive anthropocentrism, on the 
other hand, is about the locality of reference point in knowledge; that is, descriptive 
anthropocentrism assumes that humans are the measurement of the world.56 Mylius explains that 
this descriptive anthropocentrism is closely tied with, what he calls, passively normative 
anthropocentrism, which encompasses the human-centered mode of inquiry. For example, an 
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inquiry, or act of examining, presuppose that there are already at least some forms of interests in 
the object of inquiry. To this extent, passively normative anthropocentrism describes this often 
unnoticed or unconscious act of valuing in the way we study or inquiry about the world.57 
However, there is another kind of normative anthropocentrism, and that is actively normative 
anthropocentrism. Mylius describes this second kind as what environmental philosophers are 
mostly concerned with, because this actively normative anthropocentrism is about human 
superiority.58 To this extent, objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value can be described as an 
example of the unintended denial, at least struggle with, of perceptual anthropocentrism for 
overcoming actively normative anthropocentrism, as seen in the cases of Taylor and Rolston. 
The problem is that there is little attention paid to the historicity and its significance of 
overcoming anthropocentrism and of what kinds, and the struggle with anthropocentrism is not 
limited within environmental philosophy. For example, in Ecological Literature and the Critique 
of Anthropocentrism, Bryan L. Moore provides an ecocritical literary survey of anthropocentrism 
in the Western literature philosophical and religious tradition. Although anthropocentrism 
persists, Moore reformulates the existence of nonanthropocentric or antianthropocentric writings 
in the tradition, showing that opposition of anthropocentrism is a part of the tradition as well. 
One of the notable antianthropocentrisms is witnessed in the 17th century science through 
Galileo’s discovery of the heliocentric worldview. This antianthropocentrism is not in a sense of 
the opposition to normative anthropocentrism, i.e., human chauvinism, but rather to the extent of 
overcoming an anthropocentric perspective for the pursuit of scientific objective perspective.59 
As Moore quotes E.A. Burtt’s statement on Galileo, anthropos, or humans are thought as “an 
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irrelevant spectator and insignificant effect of the great mathematical system which is the 
substance of reality.”60 Galileo’s contribution of the heliocentric worldview in science, to this 
extent, can be considered to be anti-descriptive anthropocentrism.  
For another example, Cartesian dualism can be understood as the rejection of perceptual 
anthropocentrism, as it rejects the embodied understanding of the world for the sake of attaining 
a scientific worldview—“the world as it is.”61 In The Death of Nature, Carolyn Merchant 
analyses modern philosophy through Bacon and Hobbes and argues that the scientific worldview 
sees the world, including human bodies and nature, like mechanisms, through which the world 
becomes “subject to governance by law and to predictability through deductive reasoning.”62 
That is, this view configures the world as a conceivable and controllable system of mechanisms; 
the world is dissectible, replaceable, and fixable if one knows the world better. This “betterment” 
is narrowly measured in objectivity. This narrow and yet powerful lens of reduction causes, what 
Merchant calls, “the death of nature,” which illegitimates other-than-mechanistic views of nature 
and rationalizes exploitation of nature.63 To this extent, the notion of objectivity is disembodied, 
and it assumes that “humans” can and perhaps should, remove “perception” from themselves 
contradictorily. Merchant notes that although this mechanical worldview has become “common 
sense reality” nowadays, the process of the establishment was not struggle-free, being “fraught 
with anxiety, confusion, and instability in both the intellectual and social spheres,” 64 such as 
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religious and political institutions.65 To this extent, overcoming perceptual anthropocentrism is 
not merely about the struggle for intellectual certainty, as Merchant contends, but also about 
struggle for power.66  
Likewise, in “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Tim Hayward critiques the 
oversimplification of antianthropocentrism as the good in environmental philosophy, and shows 
the negative implication of overcoming anthropocentrism in the example of modern science: 
Overcoming anthropocentrism has meant appreciating that ‘Man’ is not the centre of the 
universe or the measure of all things…. This cognitive displacement of human beings 
from centre stage in the greater scheme of things has been made possible, above all, by 
developments in modern science. This detached view of humans has been made passively 
by just that kind of objectivating knowledge which more recently has been held to lie at 
the root of an attitude toward the natural world to be condemned as anthropocentric. For 
what the rise of objectivating science has done is bring with it the idea that humans can in 
some ways stand apart from the rest of nature: the achievement of objectivity carries with 
it an enhanced view of the power and autonomy of subjectivity; and that is at the heart of 
a set of attitudes which privilege human faculties, capacities and interests over those of 
nonhuman entities.67  
 
What Hayward means by “cognitive displacement of human centre of the universe” seems to 
match with Mylius’s descriptive anthropocentrism, as well as perceptual anthropocentrism, as 
the displacement is for the sake of objectivity in science in this context. As Hayward says, 
overcoming anthropocentrism, or in a sense of perceptual and descriptive anthropocentrism, 
seems to be the articulation of humans and nature dualism and that of humans’ domination over 
nature through “an enhanced view of the power and autonomy of subjectivity.”68 This imaginary 
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liberation from cognitive limitation is what makes a modern scientific worldview. As Carson 
critiques in Silent Spring, the modern scientific worldview, particularly that of humans as the 
conquers of the natural world, is one of the common problems that many environmental 
philosophers, like Merchant, tackle. 
Although Hayward critiques the debate of anthropocentrism due to its unclear 
specifications, his attempt is not to deny all of antianthropocentrism projects but to reclassify the 
critique of normative anthropocentrism as speciesism and human chauvinism in order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion. Hayward’s reasoning is in the question of how ethics, or accountability is 
possible. According to Hayward, certain parts of anthropocentrism, i.e., perceptual and 
descriptive anthropocentrism should serve as the “benchmark” of ethical judgement and action, 
“if the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action.”69 Thus, he 
argues that this benchmark is ineliminable in ethics, as “what is unavoidable about 
anthropocentrism is precisely what makes ethics possible at all.”70 Given that, he calls out 
radically nonanthropocentric axiological theory and values as “insidiously anthropocentric” in 
the manner which the intentional and unintentional denial of human role of selecting and 
applying certain values to other-than human entities “without certain warrant for doing so.”71  
One of the problems of anti-perceptual anthropocentrism is the eraser of the viewer in the 
act of viewing, and its implication in ethics and politics. In “Situated Knowledges,” Donna 
Haraway offers a feminist critique of scientific objectivity, which fabricates “a conquering gaze 
from nowhere.”72 According to Haraway, scientific objectivity aims for an impartial view 
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through denouncing limits, partiality, i.e., embodiment, in the hopes of searching “translation, 
convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality.”73 Although this impartial gaze may 
sound neutral in a sense of strict materialist understanding of the world, trying to be nowhere in 
the finite and limited earth and world actually denounces the traceability, i.e., accountability of 
our meaning-making action and deed; rather, being nowhere for the transcendental view is being 
everywhere for “the interest of unfettered power.”74 That is why Haraway does not just say “a 
gaze from nowhere” but “a conquering gaze from nowhere.” That is, knowledge that hides the 
locality of its source is irresponsible to the extent that we cannot call it into account.75 Instead, 
Haraway calls for situated knowledge, which is feminist objectivity, derived from the very 
condition that every vision is embodied so that the premise is that embodied vision is always a 
partial view. Thus, as opposed to scientific objectivity, Haraway argues that the acceptance of 
embodied subjectivity in situated knowledge is accountable as it is taking partial and locatable 
position, and importantly such normativity of the positioning is possible through “taking risks in 
a world where ‘we’ are permanently mortal, that is, not in ‘final’ control.”76 In this sense, as 
Haraway says, the issue of disembodied gaze, or anti-perspective anthropocentrism, is 
manifested in “ethics and politics more than epistemology.” 77 
If being partial is the condition for ethics to be possible, then we might be able to say that 
that is also the condition for a moral way of living with others in the world. Haraway’s account 
of situated knowledge opens a possibility of a pluralistic understanding of the world, where each 
of us is irreducible to the abstract anthropos. In other words, the issue is that although this 
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anthropos appears to encompass all humans, it is highly questionable and doubtful through an 
embodied onto-epistemological understanding. As Hayward points out, placing humanity 
altogether as the blame of ecological crisis is “a practical and strategic mistake,” which “obscure 
the real causes of the harms as much as the real incidence of benefits: the harms seldom affect all 
and only nonhumans; the benefits seldom accrue to all humans.”78 Like Obama, the former 
president of the United States used the word mankind in his speech in Hiroshima, Japan; what is 
to be blamed for the military usage of the atomic bomb is that “mankind possessed the means to 
destroy itself,”79 not a specific group nor institutions but all of humanity in the name of mankind. 
This tactic homogenizes people’s responsibility and subtly undermines social justice. From a 
political perspective, this disembodied gaze of power, in the name of objectivity or humankind, 
makes it harder for one to identify what causes, denies, and alienates oneself from one’s 
sociopolitical experience, or even from, what Arendt calls, our condition of being “earth-
bound.”80 To this extent, the critique of anthropocentrism should also address the question of 
which anthropos’ experience, perspective, and value is centered at the expense of others. Whose 
view is conceived to be objective, and whose view is dismissed at what expense?  
2.3 Overcoming What Anthropos? 
As discussed in the previous section, the earlier critique of anthropocentrism in general 
tends to frame anthropos as the locality of the problem for ecological crisis altogether without 
accounting for the differentially embodied conditions and sociopolitical experiences of humanity 
(and without accounting for the ways in which modern science is deeply anti-anthropocentric). 
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Although the critique of normative anthropocentrism is important, we do not have a unified “role 
of Homo sapiens [as] conquerors,”81 and such abstractness may dismiss the power-struggle 
within ecological crisis. In this section, I show that the refusal of placing human beings in 
general as the cause of ecological crisis does not undermine the accountability of human action 
for environmental issues; rather, arguably it is an attempt to take accountability very seriously. 
Although ecological crisis can be a threat to humanity in general, since the earth is the only home 
for humanity so far, the experience of ecological crisis is different from people to people—not 
merely at the level of bodily differences but also at a sociopolitical level. Likewise, as some 
scholars also contend, I argue that social oppression is inseparable from the domination of the 
other-than-human-world.  
For example, Murray Bookchin is one of the notable figures who advocated for critical 
analysis of ecological crisis with a strong focus on social hierarchical dynamic, such as sex, 
religion, age, politics and economic systems (e.g., capitalism).82 In his theory, social ecology, he 
argues that “the way human beings deal with each other as social beings is crucial to addressing 
the ecological crisis,”83 as he finds that the domination of nature is derived from “the domination 
of human by human.”84 According to Bookchin, this domination of human by human is rooted in 
hierarchical relationships found within as sex, religion, age, etc. Although there is much more to 
his theory, such as reconfiguration of human society in a continuum with the natural world,85 he 
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contends that we cannot solve ecological crisis without radical social change. To this extent, his 
analysis does not reduce the cause of ecological crisis to ideology independent of context, but 
finds social dynamic as the locus of ecological crisis. Bookchin’s analysis highlights the 
importance of considering humans as social beings. 
Likewise, other environmental scholars, such as ecofeminists and environmental justice 
scholars, have also critiqued environmental ethics for abstracting the “environment” and failing 
to see how race, gender, class, poverty, i.e., sociopolitical conditions shape and influence 
environmental issues, and vice versa. For example, in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val 
Plumwood, drawing from a feminist analysis, argues for “nature as the missing piece” in a 
wholistic approach toward understanding the logic of domination, in addition to race, gender, 
and class.86 That is, the domination of nature is not simply a byproduct of social problems. 
Rather, she shows that the domination of nature is an integral part of Western cultural hegemony; 
thus, we should combat such domination politically.87 To this extent, Plumwood criticizes 
Bookchin for not recognizing that the domination of nature is “as political as human relations to 
other humans,”88 as his theory asserts that the reformation of social hierarchy has to come before 
radically addressing the domination of nature.89 Rather, Plumwood argues that the way that 
Western dualism constructs and maintains the hierarchical dynamic between humans and nature 
is not separated from other forms of dualisms, such as men and women, culture and nature, self 
and other, but it is linked by associating the latter side of these other dualisms with nature “as a 
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sphere of inferiority.”90 As an example of the interconnected domination of women and nature, 
she states elsewhere that: 
Anthropocentrism and androcentrism in particular are linked by the rationalist conception 
of the human self as masculine and by the account of authentically human characteristics 
as centered around rationality and the exclusion of its contrasts (especially characteristics 
regarded as feminine, animal, or natural) as less human.91  
 
What Plumwood highlights is that the conception of human self operates exclusively, as the self 
is gendered in the image of masculinity and rationality. Plumwood’s analysis is similar to 
Simone de Beauvoir’s account of gendered subjectivity, which shows that anything that does not 
fit the narrowly constructed sphere of human subject becomes absolute Other—as the Other, or 
woman is defined as what is not the Subject, man.92 For Plumwood, this “man” is socio-
politically privileged and white.93 To this extent, Plumwood argues that hierarchical dualisms 
between humans and nature, and between men and women, should be considered together, since 
environmental exploitation and domination of women both rely on patriarchal, rationalist 
assumptions about human self.  
Furthermore, Karen Warren critiques that such failure of understanding the 
interconnectedness of domination in environmental issues “perpetuate[s], rather than 
overcome[s], the source of oppression.”94 For example, Emmanuela Opoku and Trish 
Glazebrook bring important attention to how climate change impacts people in northeast Ghana 
differently due to preexisting gender roles, and they argue that climate policy has to be gender 
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sensitive to address such unequal impacts. Although Ghanaian women, as subsistence farmers, 
play an important role in national food security despite the economically disadvantageous gender 
structure, Opoku and Glazebrook argue that both international and local levels of climate food 
policy often fail to incorporate gender analysis, stating that: 
In Ghana, gender and women’s issues are inadequately integrated into climate and 
agricultural policy for the gender gap to be closed. Given that women farmers provide at 
least seventy percent of what goes into Ghana’s national food-basket it is urgently critical 
that Ghanaian policy makers understand women’s roles in agriculture and contribution to 
food security in order that they can continue to feed the nation.95  
 
Their analysis suggests that some climate policy, environmental analysis, or environmental 
action fails to reflect the lived experience of women or those of marginalized populations, which 
may reinforce environmental injustice.  
Racial injustice is also tied up with environmental injustice. For example, Robert D. 
Bullard argues that environmentalism in the U.S. often fails to recognize racial inequalities like 
the disproportional burden of toxic waste sites on black communities compared to white 
communities.96 Furthermore, he points out that systemic racism plays into black people’s job-
related exposure to toxic industrial materials, explaining that: 
Black workers are twice as likely to be unemployed as their white counterparts. Fear of 
unemployment acts as a potent incentive for many blacks to stay in and accept jobs they 
know are health threating.97 
 
Systemic racism creates a difficult situation where black workers may feel that they need to 
prioritize job security over health. Environmental justice scholarship shows us the difficulty of 
demanding environmental justice without addressing social injustice simultaneously. In other 
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words, environmental activism that sees the degradation of “nature” as the only problem may 
reinforce systemic social injustice. 
Furthermore, seeing land as ahistorical material is problematic. The dualism between 
human and nature, or culture and nature, assumes that the former side of the binary is what 
makes meanings and history. Nature is in this regard valueless without human interference, as 
seen in John Locke’s labor theory of value.98 In this context, land is problematically thought to 
be timeless and placeless—terra nullius, empty space.99 Although this timeless and placeless 
understanding of land, what Merchant calls the death of nature, may lead to exploitation of the 
land as mere resource, the effect of abstraction does not end with land. The construction of land 
as empty space can be violent, as it leads to a failure to recognize people’s lived experience in 
the land, which includes their resistance against such abstraction. For example, Nick Estes shows 
the importance of understanding colonial context in the problem of the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(DAPL), which was originally planned to cross a predominantly white residential area but was 
relocated to north of Standing Rock for “environmental and economic concerns.”100 In contrast, 
Standing Rock appeared to the oil industry and the federal government to be empty “enough” 
space for economic gain.101 To put this into context, Estes describes how U.S. settlers relocated 
and terminated indigenous tribes for the sake of resources, and how the Oceti Sakowin have 
resisted against this serial violence. Estes emphasizes that “#NoDAPL movement is explicitly 
nonviolent,” and describes their resistance in historical continuity, claiming that “like our 
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ancestors’ war of the nineteenth century, our current war is also defensive—it is to protect water 
and land from inevitable spoliation in the name of profit.”102 However, these protesters were 
labeled as terrorists by the state power.103 Through reflecting on Estes’s situated analysis, we can 
see that philosophizing without critical and caring readings of contexts of place can be violent. In 
this regard, Leopold’s land ethic, for example, may fail to recognize the struggle and resistance 
of the people in a colonial historical context, which is indispensable for ethical consideration of 
the land and the people.  
What we should not forget is the fact that sociopolitical minorities are not simply victims 
of environmental injustice, but rather they are often at frontline fighting against such injustice, 
such as seen in Estes’s example. Many people have engaged in resistance and grass roots actions 
for environmental justice even when their opponents are their own local community, local 
government, the national government, and multi-national corporations: to name a few, Chipko 
movement in India,104 #NoDAPL movement in the U.S.,105 African-American women’s 
grassroot actions against toxic facilities in Atlanta, Georgia.106 Robert Bullard and Glenn S. 
Johnson help us to see the agency and autonomy of environmental activism of people of color in 
the U.S. in particular, stating that:    
The impetus for change came from people of color, grassroots activists, and their 
“bottom-up” leadership approach. Grassroots groups organized themselves, educated 
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themselves, and empowered themselves to make fundamental change in the way 
environmental protection is administered in their communities.107 
 
As Bullard and Johnson show, it is problematic to assume that sociopolitical minorities are only 
victims of environmental injustices; rather, we should recognize the important political role that 
sociopolitical minorities play in environmental justice. For example, the recent worldwide action 
against climate change, School Strike for Climate, was led by children and other young people in 
many parts of the world. In the movement, they took action against adults’ inaction toward 
climate change, particularly that of politicians and governments not exercising their obvious 
responsibility and privilege.108 There is no point in disregarding the youth’s demand for a livable 
earth and world due to their age alone. I discuss below more in detail on the issue of children and 
politics and how politics is possible through the work of Arendt in later chapters. As seen in the 
case of School Strike for Climate, political struggles and resistance against ecological crisis are 
not limited to those who are traditionally thought of as political.  
If we address ecological crisis politically, or perhaps, if we can recognize ecological 
crisis politically, then our inquiry, theory, and practice about ecological crisis need to take 
account of these struggles and resistance. Thus, taking the accountability of human action 
seriously does not only require asking the question of how accountability is possible, but also 
how we have failed to be accountable, and who and what has been excluded from the sphere of 
accountability. It is precisely these questions that I am concerned with in my dialogue with and 
against Arendt, a scholar who put plurality at the very heart of her political theory.  
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2.4 Existing Scholarship on Arendt and Ecological Crisis 
Arendt’s scholarly work is rarely present in the field of environmental scholarship. As 
previously discussed, one of the reasons could be that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, 
started off by arguing that environmental destruction is derived from anthropocentrism. Perhaps 
because of this, political theorists like Arendt may have not received much attention, as she is 
known for her rigorous analysis of the human condition by focusing on the vita activa, or labor, 
work, and action; i.e., what we do as humans. Another possible reason is that earlier 
environmental philosophy and ethics found the root cause of ecological crisis in our conceptions 
and values of nature, i.e., the domain of thought, to question, for example, how we think of 
nature and how we value things and ourselves. If earlier environmental philosophy had a general 
agenda, it was to figure out how we can think better to act better.109 In this type of approach, the 
problem was thought of as a systemic conceptual (ethical) issue, such as seen in the critique of 
anthropocentrism and the dualism between humans and nature, and overcoming such ideological 
problems would allow us to act ecologically soundly. However, in The Human Condition, Arendt 
takes a different approach. In her critique of modernity, she suggests that the problem is not so 
much ideological in the sense of thinking correctly or badly. Rather, what she found problematic 
in modernity is the fact that we are “unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about things 
which nevertheless we are able to do.”110 That is, the issue is our inability to comprehend the 
capacity, limits, and significance of human activities, such as labor, work, and speech and action, 
and yet we are still doing (or not doing) without understanding them. Thus, Arendt clarifies, her 
project is not to figure out thought, or how we (should) think about things, but rather to resituate 
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ourselves to figure out “what we are doing” in an existential sense.111 Arguably, her account of 
the human condition is helpful for the analysis of ecological crisis. Although there are not many, 
there are a few notable scholarly works that already critically engage with the work of Arendt 
concerning ecological crisis. In this section, I offer a review of some of these existing scholarly 
works to situate my own project and to explore her possible contributions and problems as a 
theoretical tool for analyzing ecological crisis. 
For example, Paul Voice (2013) extends Arendt’s work by critiquing the discipline of 
environmental philosophy for either often ignoring ontological questions in its search for ethical 
claims or focusing them too much to address practical application of the theory. He argues that 
Arendt’s notion of vita activa can provide an existentialist account of ontology, or human 
condition, which can enfold both issues of being (ontological) and meaning (action).112 Voice 
explains that the vita activa, which consists of labor, work, and action, is “a normative principle 
of self-understanding that addresses the question of ‘who’ (rather than ‘what’) we are and reveals, 
[Arendt] argues, the human condition.”113 For Arendt, the human condition should be understood 
through types of activities in relation to particular domains, such as earth, world, private, and 
public. For example, labor is the activity in the domain of the private, where consumption and 
reproduction take place for our biological necessity. That said, labor alone is insufficient to 
describe who we are as humanity, as Arendt considers that work and particularly action are 
indispensable activities that ensure human plurality or political life. Thus, through the lens of 
Arendt, Voice contends that our consumer society not only falsely reduces humans to mere 
consumers but also misunderstands our “human condition,” or the existential capacities, limits, 
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and significance of political life.114 That is, in such a labor-dominant way of living, political life 
already lost its significance by “view[ing] the world primarily with the eyes of a consumer.”115 
Following Voice, Arendt’s work may help us to understand addressing our relationship with 
nature alone is insufficient, especially if we need to address ecological crisis politically.  
David Macauley (1996) offers a different ecological reading of the work of Arendt, 
particularly her concept of earth alienation. In The Human Condition, Arendt describes humans 
as “earth-bound creatures,”116 meaning that “the earth is the very quintessence of the human 
condition.”117 However, she contends that through modernity, we refuse to respect the earthly 
condition in order to become “dweller[s] of the universe” for the pursuit of objectivity.118  
Macauley explains that the neglect of this earthly condition “signifies to Arendt a fundamental 
rebellion against the human condition,”119 and leads us to an alienation from the earth. Arguably, 
this alienation can be understood as a form of overcoming anthropocentrism, particularly 
perceptual and descriptive ones, as discussed previously. Macauley describes this earth 
alienation as “withdrawal from and loss of a cultural rootedness in place and estrangement from 
the earth.”120 The fact that Macauley uses the word place to describe what we are alienated from 
is important. Although Macauley values Arendt’s analysis of earth alienation, he points out that 
Arendt’s view of the earth is more like a globe, “one homogeneous whole.” Therefore, she fails 
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to see the “geographic difference and the uniqueness of living in particular places.”121 He 
suggests that Arendt’s view of the earth as space rather than place may derive from her political 
discourse about the public and private sphere, which results in Arendt failing to grasp the 
contextuality and complexity of the earth as a place.122 McCauley’s critique thus makes use of 
Arendt’s theory of alienation while filling a gap in her own theory, and is therefore vital for an 
environmental reading of Arendt.  
Jill Hargis (2016) argues that Arendt’s theory of world alienation can reveal why 
environmentalists have struggled to produce a widescale political movement for climate change 
beyond the narrative of individual self-interests. For Arendt, modernity consists of the loss of 
political significance due to the turn to the self (interests), which causes world alienation—the 
loss of collective care for the world.123 Hargis suggests that we are still in the state of world 
alienation, and thus we cannot comprehend “why acting politically is important”124 This is why 
she reasons that some environmental institutions fail to show climate change as a collective 
political issue, and instead reinforce a liberal ideology of individualism through falsely framing 
“action” for climate change as individual “choices” such as buying hybrid cars or reusable straws. 
Furthermore, she adds that such individualism is reinforced by psychological market analysis of 
green consumers in order to “control people’s reaction to the message.”125 Hargis draws from 
Arendt’s critique of psychological understanding of humans and critiques that the reduction of 
people to mere predictable consumers undermines political agency in environmental movements. 
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Instead of seeing humans in plurality, Hargis contends that the framing of individualism “not 
only radically individualizes decision making about climate change, [but] it also treats people as 
largely uniform and predictable.”126 That is, some of the tactics that environmental movements 
employ reduce spontaneous political agents into a predictable mass.  
This reduction is not limited to green consumerism. Maike Weißpflug (2019) critiques 
the abstract discourse of the Anthropocene through Arendt’s critique of modernity. The term 
Anthropocene, popularized by Paul Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer (2000),127 symbolizes a 
new geological era, in which human activities in geology and ecology exceed and alter natural 
cycles. Weißpflug problematizes the homogenized narrative of ecological destruction in the 
Anthropocene narrative, which is “deeply embedded in ideas about the relationship between man 
and nature, which has developed within the discourse of modernity.”128 Likewise, she contends 
that although politics should be formed by “the perspective of the many,” political discourse 
around environmental issues is dominated by a few technocrats’ perspectives.129 Her critique is 
drawn from Arendt’s political theory of plurality, which Arendt defines as the condition of all 
politics.130 Instead of the insular narratives of technocrats, Weißpflug argues that: 
The Anthropocene situation itself is complex and does not fit into one grand narrative: 
climate change has multitudes of impacts and biodiversity loss occurs across many scales, 
these changes take various forms and extents and exist within diverse cultural and 
historical contexts. The same is true for soil degradation, pollution, air and water quality. 
We can name and lament these things, but in this abstract form they will remain ‘thin’ 
and complex as nature and people themselves. Instead of one grand but ‘thin’ narrative, 
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thick descriptions and narratives have to be told, recent and old narratives about human-
environment relations.131 
 
]Given Arendt’s account of political condition of plurality, Weißpflug’s analysis shows the 
importance of decentralization of the Anthropocene narrative “from one unified narrative to a 
plurality of stories,” requiring the presence of many in the discourse.132 This corresponds to my 
earlier analysis about sociopolitical minorities in the discourse of environmental (in)justice. It is 
vital for us to ensure plurality for the discourse of ecological crisis.  
Following these analyses, alienation from the earth and world, or from the human 
condition seem to manifest two different issues: one is an attempt to uproot bodily or earthly 
condition of humans for objectivity, and the other is the denial of our worldly condition of 
plurality. How are alienation and world alienation related for Arendt, and possible for ecological 
crisis? Kelly Oliver’s analysis of Arendt’s theory may help. In Earth and World: Philosophy 
after the Apollo Missions (2015), Oliver explores the conceptions of earth and world of Kant, 
Arendt, Heidegger, and Derrida in order to develop an earth ethics .133 In her analysis of Arendt’s 
notions of earth and world, Oliver describes Arendt as “the philosopher of limits,”134 as she helps 
us to understand the boundaries of our existence, such as between life and world, being and 
meaning, earth and world, and labor and work.135 For example, for Arendt, the earth and the 
world are completely different things, having specific relationality as humans: one as animal 
laborans and the other as homo faber. Oliver characterizes this difference by saying that “the 
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earth corresponds to being whereas the world corresponds to meaning.”136 The earth is almost 
synonymous with the word limit to the extent that the earth literally binds our perception, 
understanding, and physical movement; the earth is the condition of our living as animal 
laborans. This limited aspect of the earthliness is important to understand how the world differs 
for Arendt. The world, which humans as homo faber built upon the earth to inhabit, signifies a 
sense of endurance and lasting against the natural cycle of life that our mortal body is bounded to. 
In this fabricated stable sphere, the common world stands where people can partake in caring for 
the meaningful cohabitation with others in plurality, or humanity; as Oliver says, the world is 
opposed to isolation, as “the world is always plural and shared.”137 
Although the world, due to its intentionality, may appear to be unbounded to anything 
other than plurality, that is not the case. Although people can be existentially spontaneous 
through action and speech,138 meanings people produce and share in the common world are still 
rooted in and bounded to the earth and our earthly body. As Haraway shows, partiality is the 
condition of responsible “part”-icipation in the world, namely, responsible cohabitation; 
impartiality is an attempt to be everywhere, resulting in the “denial of responsibility.”139 For 
Arendt, politics (where freedom, equality, and justice are sought) is possible only when we speak 
and act from our locality instead of nowhere. Thus, the earthliness is the condition of our 
meaningful cohabitation. Oliver explains that Arendt’s concern of world alienation is precisely in 
the fact we undermine our cohabitation in plurality, which “not only leave[s] us worldless but 
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also refuse[s] our humanity.”140  
To this extent, alienating from the world implies that the denial of our collective effort of 
constituting our worldly understandings and meanings, which rely on our plural partial 
perspectives. Earth alienation, the denouncement of one’s earthly condition for objective 
perspective, paves the way for alienation from the world. Arguably, earth alienation manifests 
itself as unsituated living and world alienation symbolizes the denial, or at least struggle, for 
cohabitation in plurality. Together, I interpret ecological crisis as the struggle for situated 
cohabitation. Thus, addressing ecological crisis merely as “environmental” issues may overlook 
our worldly conditions; we need to address both earth and world alienation.  
As I have shown, Arendt portrays the human condition through an understanding of the 
various limits and boundaries of our existence. However, Arendt’s theory alone may not be 
sufficient to address sociopolitical inequalities and the interdependency of our earthly existence. 
For example, Oliver argues that “although Arendt insists on our singular bonds to the earth, she 
overlooks the necessity of biodiversity of life on earth and our bonds to other earthlings.”141 
Although Arendt’s cohabitation in plurality is limited to the members of humanity and the world, 
Oliver extends this to other-than-human entities and the earth is necessary for earth ethics.142 
Moreover, as discussed previously, many environmental issues often entail environmental 
injustice due to preexisting social injustices, often associated with gender, race, disability, and 
economic class. Arendt’s theory alone may not adequately address the fact that partaking in 
shaping and sharing the common world is not struggle-free, particularly for the marginalized 
population.  
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Judith Butler’s critical reading of Arendt is also important for understanding the 
insufficiency of Arendt’s theory and yet the possibilities for a more inclusive political theory. 
Although Butler’s project in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (2015) is not 
precisely about ecological struggle, her proposal of an ethics of unchosen cohabitation through 
her reading of Arendt is valuable for the question concerning how to live together on the earth 
and in the world.143 For Arendt, the private sphere is a realm of necessities, where people are 
primarily concerned with family affairs including consumption and reproduction—labor. The 
public sphere is supposed to be a political space where people discuss and negotiate beyond their 
immediate concerns of the private sphere. For Arendt, the political space is described as “the 
space of appearance,” which only emerges when people act and speak in plurality.144 In other 
words, those who can engage in political affairs in the public sphere are only those who can set 
aside their immediate life concerns, such as childrearing, hunger, health, and poverty; that is, the 
public sphere is understood in the image of independence. Thus, Butler argues that Arendt’s 
concept of politics disavows many sociopolitical minorities and fails to acknowledge that we are 
fundamentally interdependent and precarious.145 However, Butler sees that Arendt’s theory of 
plurality asserts an ethical grounding in “the unchosen character of earthly cohabitation,” as it is 
“the condition of our very existence as ethical and political beings.”146 That is, plurality serves as 
a normative ground that we cannot choose with whom to coinhabit the earth. Butler discusses the 
possibility of extending her political theory not only to inhabitants of the earth but the earth itself, 
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saying that “I seek to offer an ecological supplement to Arendt’s anthropocentrism.”147 I discuss 
Butler’s contributions along with her performativity theory in more depth to expand Arendt’s 
contribution for ecological crisis in Chapter 4.  
Following these previous analyses, what Arendt may offer is that ecological crisis is not 
merely the denial of our earthly condition, but also the neglect of our common world. For my 
broader dissertation project, I would like to put ecological crisis into a context of moral and 
political crisis, instead of merely seeing it as a crisis of the earth alone. Furthermore, if partiality 
makes it possible to live morally with others, then in our theory and practice of ecological crisis 
we should resist alienating anthropos both from our earthly and worldly conditions. To this 
extent, this dissertation is rooted in the work of Arendt to offer the understanding that ecological 
crisis is the struggle for situated cohabitation. This “struggle” should not be understood and 
reduced in the abstract and total name of anthropos. Rather, the term struggle describes my 
political and ethical commitment of plurality to ensure that the lived experience of differently 
embodied people and their relationship with other-than-human entities and the land are present 
and recognized in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ON EARTH AND WORLD ALIENATION: READING ARENDT ON ECOLOGICAL CRISIS  
3.1 Situating The Human Condition 
Hannah Arendt starts her book The Human Condition (1958) with a story of the launch of 
the first Russian satellite Sputnik into outer space in 1957, which was an event “second in 
importance to no other, not even to the splitting of the atom.”148 Arendt was especially struck by 
an American reporter’s comment on this event as a “step toward escape from men’s 
imprisonment to the earth,” 149 as it revealed the ironic sentiment that the earth is an obstacle to 
the striving of humanity. The juxtaposition of the earth as a burden and the progress of humanity 
certainly appears to be a contradictory dichotomy when we consider that humans are “earth-
bound creatures,” as Arendt describes.150 How do we come to perceive the earth as a form of 
imprisonment? For her, the fact that technocratic society is able to enact such escape, and yet 
unable to comprehend and speak about the meaning of such self-contradictory action manifests 
the collapse of our common world and politics in modernity.  
In this chapter, I analyze Arendt’s critique of modernity, particularly focusing on her 
analysis of earth alienation and world alienation, in order to explore the question concerning 
earthly and worldly cohabitation, what I call situated cohabitation. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
although Arendt does not theorize about ecological crisis per se, Arendt’s analysis of 
modernity’s alienation from earth and world can help us understand that ecological crisis is a 
matter of both the denial of earthly and worldly living. As suggested by The Human Condition’s 
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original intended title of amor mundi, or “Love of the World,”151 Arendt’s intention of the book 
is not simply to describe the conditions of human activities per se, but arguably to consider our 
worldly living on the earth. Her book is a story of what happens when the conditions of our 
earthly and worldly cohabitation are ignored, misunderstood, and destroyed.  
I argue that her critique of modernity allows us to see in depth the historicity of 
antianthropocentrism, or the scientific and philosophical denial of such earthly and worldly 
conditions in search of certainty. Arendt argues that part of this denial is derived from blurred 
distinctions and characteristics of our fundamental human activities, labor, work, and action, 
what Arendt calls the vita activa, throughout the Western philosophical tradition. More 
specifically, the issue for Arendt is that blurred distinctions of the vita activa ultimately lead to 
the destruction of shared meanings and world, which are possible through our plural partial 
(embodied) perspectives. Thus, I first analyze the vita activa in order to understand what we are 
actually alienated from and how, and then analyze what alienation means to modernity and 
possibly to ecological crisis.  
However, my attempt here is not to merely focus on her critique of modernity as a sheer 
disciplinary critique of Western philosophical tradition, as such reading of her work neglects her 
lived experience, struggle, and profound care for the world. Margaret Canovan suggests that we 
should read The Human Condition while keeping in mind Arendt’s experience and writing about 
totalitarianism,152 through which Arendt perceived the arrogant belief of “human 
omnipotence”153 and witnessed “crimes against humanity.”154 Through her examination of 
 
151 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 2nd ed. (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 
2004), p. 324. 
152 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 99–104. 
153 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new edition with added prefaces (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 
1979), p. vi. 
42 
Eichmann’s trial and the Nazi regime, Arendt finds the god-like act of choosing who may and 
may not live on the earth destroys and contradicts the idea of humanity and of the human 
condition of plurality,155 as Arendt considers that “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit 
the world.”156 Canovan argues that such a reading of The Human Condition allows us to 
understand that her critique of modernity is not a way for her to “recommend an idealized 
version of Athenian” political theory per se, but rather to understand it “as [her] analysis of a 
desperate predicament and as [her] story with a moral.”157 Drawing from Canovan’s 
interpretation, I engage with Arendt’s work as a way of analyzing the desperate predicament of 
ecological crisis, instead of presenting it as an ideal theoretical solution for ecological crisis. 
Through this engagement, I argue that Arendt’s analysis of earth and world helps us to question 
the conditions of living together with others on the earth and in the world—situated cohabitation 
in the time of the ecological crisis.  
3.2 The Conditions of the Vita Activa  
In order to understand Arendt’s critique of modernity, particularly with a focus on earth 
and world alienation, first it is important to understand her analysis and configuration of the vita 
activa. 158 Labor, work, and action (which includes speech) are the threefold activities that 
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constitute the vita activa, the active life of humans.159 From an immediate impression, one may 
assume that these are the qualities that define what humans are in an essential sense. However, 
Arendt describes humans as “conditioned beings” in an existential sense.160 Arendt explains that 
these three activities are “fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions 
under which life on earth has been given to man.”161 For example, life is the condition of labor; 
worldliness is the condition of work; plurality is the condition of action. In other words, we are 
conditioned to labor to the extent that the earth gives us life; our arrival and departure as 
irreducible unique beings are conditioned by the existence of our common world; our political 
freedom is not given but conditioned by the collective actions of others.162 Arendt shows that 
some of the conditions are not made by us but are given, while others are made out of collective, 
perhaps generational efforts both intended and unintended. Among these conditions, as Kelly 
Oliver puts it, the earth and world are two distinct conditions that contrast as given and made 
respectively,163 and arguably such distinction is indispensable for us to make sense of our doing 
within our limits and possibilities, i.e., responsible living with others on the earth and in the 
world. In this section, I analyze each of Arendt’s aspects of the vita activa with a focus on the 
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conditions of our earthly and worldly living.  
3.2.1 Labor and Work 
First, I focus on Arendt’s distinction between labor and work to properly understand the 
relationality of each activity in their given spheres, the earth and the world, and how these 
spheres are distinguished. Arendt’s notion of labor is derived from her conversation with and 
against her predecessor political theorists. Inheriting from Aristotle’s distinction between 
political and biological life, Arendt explains that laboring is our way of sustaining our biological 
bodies, or life. For example, harvesting food for consumption is a form of labor, the motivation 
for which is driven by the necessity of life, i.e., “wants and needs.”164 Arendt describes this 
mode of human existence as animal laborans, the primary concern of which is the sustenance of 
biological life as an individual and species.165 Our bodies grow and decay, as all life on the earth 
that also shares the life process.166 We are all subject to our bodily existence and necessity, and 
for Arendt, this condition is what labor should be for, nothing more or less.  
Drawing from the ancient Greek’s view of nature as immortal,167 Arendt perceives life 
(particularly that of species) as endlessness and cyclical process, and labor is not opposed to this 
cyclical nature of life, but rather enslaved (Arendt’s word) to its endless recurrence.168 To this 
extent, things we produce from our labor do not break from the cyclical process but are rather 
absorbed into the cyclical process of life; as there is no day that our metabolism willfully stops. 
Although Arendt problematizes Locke’s and especially Marx’s labor theory for “their equation 
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of work with labor,”169 Arendt also finds Locke’s and Marx’s characterizations of labor helpful 
for grasping our relationality with laboring materials; she specifically notes Marx’s description 
of labor as “men’s metabolism with nature,”170 as well as Locke’s assertion that labor “bodily 
‘mixes with’ the things provided by nature.”171 As Nicholas H. Smith (2019) helpfully interprets 
Arendt here, “the labour of the body is ontologically continuous with the natural material it 
mixes with, the mixing done by the labour serves merely to bring out a fecundity inheriting in the 
life process itself.”172 Given this endless and repetitive process of laboring, Arendt explains that 
ancient Greeks, for example, enslaved others as an attempt to liberate themselves from such 
burden.173 Furthermore, Arendt points out Marx’s misunderstanding of the condition of labor 
that liberating oneself from labor “will automatically nourish other ‘higher’ activities.”174 Such 
understanding induces a confusion because no matter how hard one labors or no matter how 
technology seems to reduce our immediate bodily labor, it cannot result in “changes in the basic 
condition of human life on earth.”175 That is, we are always subject to the life process and labor 
is not meant to break us from it. Labor conforms to the condition of our life on the earth, as “the 
earth is the very quintessence of the human condition.”176 
On the other hand, Arendt says that work is the necessary activity for the fabrication of 
the world in which humans come to exist beyond their mere biological life. The function of work, 
as opposed to labor, is to achieve and embody endurability and stability that mortal humans, as 
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animal laborans, do not possess naturally.177 For example, traditional craftworkers and artisans 
may represent this mode of engagement in the world by turning natural materials into houses, 
chairs, and tables, which can last a long time with appropriate care.178 What role these worldly 
materials serve is twofold. One is, given their durability, that worldly objects can resist and 
endure the life of necessity, by giving “relative independence from men who produced and use 
them…and [from] the voracious needs and wants of their living makers and users.”179 Although 
worldly objects often serve the purpose of utility (such as the utility of a chair, which is to sit in 
during rest, study, eating, etc.), Arendt explains that worldly objects’ independence from makers 
and users (the chair exists even when it is not used) constitute “objectivity” in things themselves 
and in the world.180 This objectivity is what work, not labor, can bring into the world out of the 
eternal and cyclical cycle of nature:  
Only we who have erected the objectivity of a world of our own from what nature gives 
us, who have built it into the environment of nature so that we are protected from her, can 
look upon nature as something “objective.” Without a world between man and nature, 
there is eternal movement, but not objectivity.181 
 
At first glance, her explanation of the objectivity of a world appears to suggest the earth as 
something undesirable. However, the point here is not that work should replace the role of labor, 
or vice versa. As previously discussed, humans are all subject to the natural cycle of life, and that 
itself is a human condition; thus, labor is needed as we are earth-bound beings. I interpret that 
what she means by protection from nature is not so much about the literal sense of the natural 
environment, but more about the symbolic representation of ontological monism in nature—the 
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eternal cycle of nature. Although we as mortal beings are equally part of the natural cycle of life 
with the rest of life on the earth, Arendt perceives the importance of a worldly vantage point, 
which gives us a clear definitive sense of time, beginning and end, in our making.182 
What Arendt sees in work but not labor is what Paul Ott (2009) describes as, “the 
objectification of objects qua objects.”183 That is, the ability to cognize, relate, and fabricate 
things as objects. Arendt explains as follows: 
It is only within the human world that nature’s cyclical movement manifests itself as 
growth and decay…. Only when they enter the man-made world can nature’s process be 
characterized by growth and decay; only if we consider nature’s products, this tree or this 
dog, as individual things, thereby already removing them from their “natural” 
surroundings and putting them into our world, do they begin to grow and decay.184 
 
What this means in a broader picture of Arendt’s concern of “love of the world” is that not only 
does a tree need to enter into the world to become “this tree,” but that this is ultimately the same 
for humans. The world, or our “appearance and disappearance” into the world is what makes 
humans individual and irreplaceable beings with their own life stories—none of our stories are 
ever the same.185 
This leads to the second purpose of worldly materials, which is, by constructing the 
objectivity of the world, to grant the locus of shared meanings, understandings, or the common 
world. The common world is “the common meeting ground of all,”186 where we can 
communicate with others and have common sense, as our life is “always rooted in a world of 
man and of man-made things” and “never leaves or altogether transcends.”187 This corresponds 
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to her emphasis on the Roman interpretation that “to live” existentially means “to be among 
men” and “death” means “to cease to be among men.”188 In other words, our life starts and ends 
with “not Man” in a singular omnipotence sense but “men” in plural sense. This plurality is, as 
Arendt states in The Life of the Mind, “one of the basic existential conditions of human life on 
earth.”189  
Thus, by objectivity of the world, Arendt does not mean a transcendental matter. For 
Arendt, worldly things and matters prevent us from being consumed into the cyclical power of 
natural current, like labor, and simultaneously prevents us from stumbling over each other. 
Arendt elaborates: 
To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those 
who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, 
like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.”190  
 
By standing physically between people, worldly objects, like a table, simultaneously help keep 
us apart and yet relate to each other. This gives us a worldly vantage point where we can 
perceive objects in common, and “out of which arise their specific, objective, worldly 
interests.”191 To this extent, Arendt distinguishes the affairs of animal laborans as private and 
those of homo faber as public, in order to keep individualistic immediate concerns driven by 
wants and needs apart from worldly, perhaps political affairs, which should concern more than 
one’s personal interests.192 I discuss the issues of the blurred boundary between private and 
public in later sections. 
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For Arendt, this in-betweenness of the world constitutes the condition of our plurality 
where each of us can appear as a being in the presence of others. Arendt explains that with the 
power of reification of the earth into the world, birth and death of humans can be distinguished 
from “simple natural occurrences” and become “worldly events” where each of us can appear to 
others as “single individuals, unique, unexchangeable, and unrepeatable entities.”193 To this 
extent, Arendt insists on distinguishing the mode of human existence in the world from that of 
the earth for the sake of granting space for plurality.  
Arendt explains that the sustenance of the common world relies on plurality, or “the 
simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives,”194 and as Jerome Kohn notes, these 
innumerous perspectives inform “our vision through the vision of others, both living and 
dead.”195 The common world is not merely collectively built by those who are alive but also by 
generations of the dead. That said, taking care of the world does not just mean something like 
preserving worldly materials in museums. In “The Crisis of Education,” Arendt argues that 
adults, particularly educators, have a responsibility toward children to introduce them into the 
world. Stephanie Mackler interprets Arendt’s claim by saying that “giving a world to children” is 
not simply bestowing “cups and sculptures” to them.196 Rather, what we are responsible for is 
the introduction of “a subset of the world… : the ideas, concepts, values, and narratives that unite 
us in common understanding, endowing human life with relative coherence and reliability.”197 
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Likewise, Natasha Levinson argues that the world does not simply exist out there but has an 
“intersubjective dimension.”198 The ways we relate and engage with others in the world are part 
of such worldly education; thus taking care of the world is something to be fostered and it 
requires us “to participate with others in the collective shaping of the world.”199 For Arendt, this 
participation can be realized in the modes of speech and action, which I explain in the following 
section.  
So far, I have shown how Arendt’s dichotomy between labor and work corresponds to the 
earth and the world. For Arendt, the earth symbolizes our bodily condition of life on the earth, 
and the world symbolizes our worldly condition of plural existence. The reason why this 
distinction is important for her is precisely to remind us that the world is our making, not a given, 
of work but not labor. And yet, neither work nor labor are supposed to replace each other. As 
Arendt describes that “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world,”200 we are always 
already conditioned both in the earth and world. For Arendt, both earthly and worldly living are 
necessary conditions of our existence and are achieved and maintained through the activities of 
labor and work.  
3.2.2 Action 
Although labor and work correspond to the conditions of our earthly and worldly living, 
Arendt argues that they alone are insufficient to achieve political life. As previously mentioned, 
Arendt considers that homo faber can erect objectivity in the world through fabricating worldly 
objects, which is the necessary condition for the common world—the space for plurality. 
 
198 Natasha Levinson, “A ‘More General Crisis’: Hannah Arendt, World-Alienation, and the Challenges of Teaching 
for the World As It Is,” Teachers College Record 112, no. 2 (2010): 467. 
199 Levinson, “A ‘More General Crisis’,” p. 477. 
200 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 7. 
51 
However, ultimately although worldly objects constitute space by laying between us, they do not 
constitute human plurality itself. Drawing from Aristotle, Arendt considers that the political life 
of humans should be actualized through action and speech of bios politikos, not the work of 
homo faber.201 This is because the disposition of homo faber is the fabrication of things, and the 
intention of such creation is for utility—creating things as a means to serve an end. Arendt’s 
concern here is the meaninglessness or “the instrumentalization of the whole world and the 
earth” through the hands and lens of homo faber. 202 That is, the utilitarian nature of homo faber 
cannot ground the value of things intrinsically beyond the circle of means and ends. Putting this 
into the context of her analysis of totalitarianism, Arendt warns that “masses of people are 
continuously rendered superfluous if we continue to think of our world in utilitarian terms.”203 
Ultimately, Arendt contends that politics, through which freedom and equality is pursued, 
cannot be achieved strictly in a utilitarian sense.  
In response to this, Arendt explains that action and speech are the only political actions, 
which are constituted in our condition of natality, or ability to initiate new beginnings. 204 As the 
term suggests, natality refers to birth, and Arendt interprets “the birth of new men” as “the birth 
of new beginning.”205 Coming to exist in the world through birth is a precondition of any of the 
vita activa, and each birth always gives newness or uniqueness to the world. Given that, Arendt 
grasps natality as an ability to initiate new beginnings, and that is where “the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted.”206 Through speech and action, we disclose ourselves into the world, “like 
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a second birth,”207 and what unfolds from such arrival is always “unexpected” as one can 
perform “what is infinitely improbable” by the virtue of natality.208 This unpredictability of 
action and speech also differs from work, as work is done with a clear intention and outcome in 
mind whereas “action has no end.”209 Due to this lack of controllability, another aspect of action 
and speech is irreversibility. As opposed to a self-sufficient view of autonomy, Arendt conceives 
the fact that we cannot undo things we have initiated is what makes freedom possible. Freedom 
for Arendt lies in the ability to initiate anew (i.e., natality) even if what would be brought from 
the initiation is uncontrollable and irreversible to the initiator; it does not lay in the ability to 
control of one’s doing, like a homo faber.210   
As Canovan notes, Arendt’s intention of political theory is to ground her political theory 
in pluralism, in order to oppose her predecessors in political theory, which tends to depict a 
human as “an abstract subject that existed only in the singular” in their theories.211 Arendt 
explains that the tradition of Western philosophy, such as in Plato, has tendencies to withdraw 
from the world of political reality (un-quiet) in the pursuit of the truth, which was often thought 
to appear only in the absolute quiet, 212 or “outside the plurality of men.”213 Descartes follows the 
same approach to the extent that instead of seeking certainty among peers, he turns to himself, 
specifically to his mind.214 Although Marx does not concern himself with certainty or truth like 
Plato and Descartes do, Arendt condemns Marx’s view of humans as animal laborans for 
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undermining the pluralistic understanding of history, action, and politics, because such an 
understanding renders the view that everything that happened and ought to happen would be 
justified as an inevitable process of social and natural cycles. To this extent, Arendt sees the 
danger of totalitarianism in Marx’s philosophy. 215   
How Arendt distinguishes herself from others is precisely in that the condition of politics 
is plurality but not in isolation, stating that “action, as distinguished from fabrication is never 
possible in isolation.”216 This is because her understanding of political agency is always situated 
in the innumerable web of human relationships: 
The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships 
which exists whenever men live together. The disclosure of the “who” through speech, 
and the setting of a new beginning through action, always falls into an already existing 
web where their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new process 
which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely 
the life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact.217 
 
This understanding of a life story as woven in a web clarifies the fact that Arendt’s account of 
agency is always conditioned in plurality, as politics relies on the presence of others—being seen 
and heard from each unique perspective in the web of relationships. This locus of disclosure in 
the web is called a space of appearance, which, according to Arendt, is enacted when people 
engage collectively in the manner of speech and action. 218 The space of appearance is the basis 
of the public realm, and the enactment of such political space does not rely on any existing 
associations, such as nationality or religions, but solely on action and speech—the birth right of 
human natality. Drawing from the ancient Greek, Arendt distinguishes the public sphere from the 
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private on the basis of the different relationality that each sphere upholds. She associates the 
private sphere with home, oikia, where kinship binds families and household necessity is taken 
care of. The public sphere, on the other hand, is the space for equality, in which no domination or 
violence should take place either by others or oneself. 219 For Arendt, political life is actualized 
through the exchange of speech and deeds (not violence) with other peers in the public realm, 
distinguishing it from the private realm where satisfying the necessities through labor is the 
dominant concern. Being-together in the public space consists in the very fact that no one can 
choose “whom [one] reveals when [one] discloses [one]self in deed or word,” and thus one 
“must be willing to risk the disclosure.”220 This means that action and speech always initiate a 
chance for unknown, unexpected outcomes regardless of the original intentions. Thus, Arendt 
finds political virtue when one willingly takes the risk of this uncontrolled disclosure of oneself 
in the presence of others in the public realm.221 As Emma Ingala puts it, Arendt’s political theory 
establishes an “irreducible plurality” in which any person can distinguish themselves through 
their speech and action in the presence of others and never be devised into a homogenized 
political body.222  
In sum, Arendt’s conception of the vita activa seems to carefully examine and question 
the earthly, worldly, and political conditions of living with others in plurality. Each activity of 
the vita activa has a distinct meaning in a given sphere and shows a distinct way to relate to 
things, such as body, materials, and others. Life on the earth is given, the world needs to be 
collectively made with care, and yet our life in this world is unpredictable. For Arendt, we 
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should embrace each of the conditions, even when they are a burden to us.  
3.2.3 Worldlessness: The Rise of the Social 
Through examining the vita activa in depth, we see Arendt’s careful ways to set 
boundaries of each activity and its related realm. As Oliver describes Arendt as “the philosopher 
of limits,”223 Arendt lays out how such limits are important for the actualization of plurality 
through earthly and worldly living. In this section, I focus on her concerns of the blurred 
boundaries of the vita activa and the private and the public, which leads to worldlessness in the 
emergence of “laboring society.”224 This section allows us to question what happens when the 
conditions of our earthly and worldly cohabitation are ignored, misunderstood, and destroyed. 
One of the major critiques Arendt makes in The Human Condition is the blurred 
understanding among labor, work, and action in the modern age, which she argues brought two 
important consequences: “reversal of traditions” and “glorification of labor as the source of all 
values.”225 Arendt argues this reversal is partly owed to the tradition of political philosophers, 
such as Plato, who valued contemplation above other activities so much that the distinctions of 
vita activa was ignored altogether. Such ignorance was so severe that that “even political activity 
was leveled to the rank of necessity.”226 For Arendt, although modernity was not the origin of 
this blurred distinction,227 the modern age was its hallmark to the extent that the lowly activity of 
labor made it to the top of the human condition by political philosophers. 
For example, Arendt explains that Locke and Smith are notable examples of political 
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thinkers in the modern age who valued labor as an unlimited source of property and wealth 
through the lens of productivity. As labor symbolizes the endlessness of life process, Arendt sees 
how these theorists who are concerned with the science of growing wealth and property, i.e., 
economy, chose labor over work and action.228 However, she condemns particularly Marx for 
blending the attributes of work (productivity) and action (uniqueness) into labor, 229 which 
resulted in reconfiguring labor as “the expression of the very humanity of man” in the modern 
age.230 For Arendt, Marx’s view of humans as animal laborans instead of animal rationale 
appears to be his rebellion against the Western tradition. She summarizes Marx’s thought as 
arguing that “labor (and not God) created man [and] . . . labor (and not reason) distinguished man 
from the other animals . . . .”231 Although some scholars have already questioned and analyzed 
the accuracy of Arendt’s reading of Marx,232 what Arendt ultimately tries to critique in Marx is 
his neglect of the objective world, deriving this point from his dialectic analysis that focuses on 
process. In “On Needing Both Marx and Arendt,” Jennifer Ring gives a helpful account of how 
both Arendt and Marx each respond differently to the objective world through the lens of 
materialism: 
Both thinkers are trying to “claim” the material world. Marx’s dialectical methodology, 
however, leads him inevitably to think in terms of process so that the material world upon 
which he grounds his political theory cannot be regarded as static or even stable. From 
the perspective of Marx’s methodology, the stability Arendt seeks in the material world is 
illusion. Perhaps Arendt would argue that the very possibility of dialectical method with 
its eternally clashing and dissolving borders could have arisen only in response to a world 
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in which permanence had already begun to lose its importance.233 
 
What this suggests is that Arendt grants the condition of humanity upon the existence of a 
durable world, whereas Marx, given his critique of the exploitation of workers in capitalism, 
grants the condition of humanization of labors upon the liberation of the working class via 
“worker’s conscious control over production and creation that can make labor a ‘human’ activity, 
regardless of what is produced.”234 That is, as Ring’s analysis shows, Marx’s theory in the eyes 
of Arendt dangerously employs the life process of animal laborans as the lens to understand the 
experience of class struggle in historical context, and it promotes that the control over the life 
process (i.e., the mode of labor production), but not plurality or the common world, should be the 
dominant social discourse for freedom. Arendt, who experienced a totalitarian regime as a 
stateless person, could not resist but to see the danger of Marxist focus on labor as the locus and 
concern of politics, undermining the distinctions of the vita activa, or the conditions of plural 
existence in the earth and world.   
Arendt argues that modernity symbolizes the loss of the world through “the emancipation 
of the laboring activity” from the private realm, where consumption is the dominant concern.235 
This emancipation corresponds to what Arendt calls “the rise of the social,” which is a sort of 
invasion of the household affairs into the public discourse, such as economics, health, and 
consumption.236 For Arendt, the advent of consumer society in the modern world is a 
quintessential phenomenon of laboring society, where people as animal laborans are no longer 
sure how to take care of the worldly materials but start “treating all use objects as though they 
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were consumer goods, so that a chair or a table is now consumed as rapidly as a dress and a dress 
used up almost as quickly as food.”237 Our current discourse of sustainability may also appear to 
Arendt as a struggle of the worldlessness of our time.  
However, the loss of the world does not simply mean that the world has vanished from 
our sight, like we consumed up everything. As we know, our society is filled with artificial stuff, 
and the stuff our consumer society produces, which used to be in the category of work, is treated 
like consumer goods. However, these goods cannot easily be consumed in a biological sense, 
like plastic, and even this traditional consumptive stuff, like food, fails to be properly consumed 
in the cycle of nature but is instead disposed of, while a good percentage of the world population 
still does not have safe access to the basic necessities, such as clean water and food. This mirrors 
Arendt’s description of society, or “unnatural growth of the natural,” in which labor far out-
produces our consumptive abilities.238 
Arendt also links the rise of the social with the loss of political significance. Given the 
loss of the world, Arendt argues that people are expected to behave (not act) as part of the mass 
or mob—a homogeneous unit in mass society. As opposed to the public realm where there is no 
prerequisite agreement, Arendt writes that the social realm builds on particular interests and 
associations of the members. In other words, strong social conformism becomes the condition of 
the participation for politics. In the same vein, Arendt points out the rise of social science in the 
modern age, which tends to suggest that people are predictable according to “laws” in each 
discipline of study, such as behavioral science, which “aim[s] to reduce man as a whole, in all his 
activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal.”239 For those who fail to meet the 
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“standard” behavior as social beings, then the translation of such behavior will likely be 
understood as abnormal.240  
Returning to her concerns of the love of the world, the blurred distinction of the vita 
activa and that of the public and private lead to worldlessness in modernity. In such a condition, 
we ultimately fail “the task of renewing a common world.”241 Her analysis asks what would be 
left when this laboring society also aims to eliminate labor through automation, to consume up 
the world which gives us the common ground to form common interests and reality with others, 
and to reduce the significance of action and speech to the level of mass behavior, which fails to 
distinguish oneself and others in the irreducible plurality. The crisis of worldlessness brings 
homelessness and superfluousness—the loss of the stable world for plurality.  
3.3 The Other Side of Modernity: Earth Alienation and World Alienation 
In the previous sections, we see how Arendt describes the earth and world differently in 
her understanding of the existential conditions for our irreducible plurality and how the blurred 
distinctions of the vita activa and the private and the public in the modern age ground her claim 
for the loss of such conditions—worldlessness. However, her critique of modernity does not end 
there. In the prologue of The Human Condition, Arendt expresses the “perplexities”242 that 
contemporary technocratic society wishes to liberate us from our fundamental condition of earth-
boundedness, even though we are always already earth-bound beings. This liberation, for Arendt, 
is better understood as alienation, being uprooted from the conditions of earthly and worldly 
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living, or our situated cohabitation. Furthermore, this is complexified by the fact that, according 
to Arendt, we are nothing but animal laborans due to the rise of laboring society; that is, the 
significance of action and speech has been lost.243  
What Arendt sees in the event of Sputnik is a perplexing glimpse of human natality. As 
previously mentioned, Arendt considers that each of us has the ability to initiate unexpected 
beginnings by virtue of birth. In this sense, the launch of Sputnik in the hope for “escape from 
men’s imprisonment to the earth”244 seems to be derived from the unexpectedness of human 
natality, regardless of its outcomes. However, in light of her political theory, the point of natality 
is to ensure the grounds for action in plurality. That is, the presence of irreducible plural 
perspectives in the world is what makes one’s arrival (through one’s action and speech) in the 
world unique.245 Arendt’s concern with modernity is precisely about the reduction of plural 
perspectives into a homogeneous mass through instituting a more predictable and controllable 
world. As Stephanie Meckler points out, the launch of Sputnik was an event that disclosed 
technological development in modernity, which wants to eliminate “the uncontrollable, 
unpredictable, and unknown,”246 leading to the fully “controlled human-made ‘world’ that 
Arendt would call a nonworld.”247 Arendt considers that this technological development 
symbolizes this perplexity of modernity, which aims to alter and transcend at its will the 
conditions of earthbound-worldly creatures even if such transcendence is self-defeating.248 In 
this section, I analyze earth and world alienation, which she describes as a “twofold flight from 
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the earth into the universe and from the world into the self, ”249 in order to elaborate on Arendt’s 
critique of modernity. By doing so, as discussed in Chapter 2, we can see the historicity of 
antianthropocentrism and what this implies in ecological crisis.  
In her analysis of earth and world alienation, Arendt emphasizes that there are three 
historical events that shaped the course of the modern age. One of the three is what Arendt calls 
“the discovery of America,” in which “the immensity of available space on earth was 
discovered” through new technical developments in mapping and charting.250 What this brought 
is, however, “the famous shrinkage of the globe,” through the act of surveying itself.251 What 
shrank is distance, as it became manageable through the use of speed; how fast it takes to reach a 
destination is now a more meaningful question than how far away the destination is.252 Arendt 
discusses that conquering distance is an important element of surveying, as follows:  
It is the nature of the human surveying capacity that it can function only if man 
disentangles himself from all involvement in and concern with the close at hand and 
withdraws himself to a distance from everything near him. The greater the distance 
between himself and his surroundings, world or earth, the more he will be able to survey 
and to measure and the less will worldly, earth-bound space be left to him.253 
 
That is, more and more, one can become detached and distanced from one’s immediate 
surroundings, and then one can get closer to grasping the objective data of things. The process of 
withdrawal from human sense perception to objectivity implies that abstractness is valued as 
accuracy. This scientific notion of objectivity differs from Arendt’s account of objectivity that is 
erected by the hands of homo faber. Objectivity for Arendt means that the stable world lies in 
between us to create a worldly vantage point from where we can see the common thing from 
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each of our unique perspectives; objectivity for Arendt is not like the modern scientific 
understanding of a transcendental view from nowhere but it is the very condition of how we form 
our common interests between us. In other words, Arendt’s objectivity needs to be accompanied 
by the partiality of our views, whereas scientific objectivity needs to denounce partiality for 
impartiality. Paradoxically, the world that is reconstructed with such sense-and-value-free data of 
modern science may appear to be “more real” than “the world we live in.”254 As the quote above 
implies, the issue is that the distance that is required for this type of survey alienates those who 
survey from both the world and earth, even though these are the conditions for our irreducible 
plurality. As discussed through Donna Haraway in Chapter 2, such scientific objectivism 
obscures the locality of gaze and pretends to be from nowhere, even though being nowhere is a 
very act of being everywhere for “the interest of unfettered power.”255  
The second event that shaped the modern age is the expropriation of church property due 
to the Reformation, which resulted in the individual expropriation of land and the creation of the 
possible condition for the accumulation of social wealth.256 Arendt explains that property, prior 
to this expropriation, was “no more or less than to have one’s location in a particular part of the 
world.”257 Generationally passed down place allows peasants to have stability; however, by 
losing it, “they were turned into day laborers entirely absorbed in the struggle to satisfy their 
bodily needs.”258 Peg Birmingham contributes here an important reading of Arendt’s analysis of 
expropriation and the production of superfluous people: 
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Arendt argues that the process of expropriation not only marks the beginning of the 
“monstrous process of accumulation” but continues to animate the process as it picks up 
increasing force with the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, whose desire for 
unlimited acquisition and accumulation moves imperialist politics from the nation state to 
the global stage, producing thousands of politically and economically superfluous human 
beings.259 
 
This aligns with the colonial expansion and shrinkage of the world, through which colonized 
countries and regions tend to experience severe economic and political injustice wherein the 
local residents, such as indigenous people, are uprooted from their land and homes for the wealth 
of colonial nation-states and corporations, as discussed in Chapter 2. Ecological crisis includes 
the struggle against the violent act of uprooting people from the land. 
The third event, which is the most significant for Arendt, is Galileo’s telescopic 
discoveries, which enabled the astrophysical world view that views the earth (as well as nature 
and human beings) as part of the laws of the universe from the outside of the earth, and applies 
such cosmic laws back onto the earth.260 Arendt explains that the discovery of a standpoint 
located outside the earth in the universe, or the Archimedean point, is what “modern natural 
science owes its great triumphs,” as it makes it possible to perceive the earth from the outside.261 
The telescope made this Archimedean point, not by mere imagination but by a tool. Arendt 
explains that this event of Galileo signifies another reversal of tradition from ancient philosophy, 
since the product of work (the telescope), rather than contemplation, “finally forced nature, or 
rather the universe, to yield its secrets,”262 as opposed to the notion of truth as self-revelation.263 
This forcefulness or violence is part of the relationship between homo faber, who Arendt calls a 
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“destroyer of nature,” 264 and nature, whose natural recurrence homo faber must disrupt for 
production.  
This reversal reflects “the mistrust of the given”265 in modern science, in which it is 
believed that our bodily and earthly, or anthropocentric and geocentric, conditions cannot 
adequately perceive objective truth, but rather lead to deception. Arendt claims that the rise of 
homo faber in modern science lies in the needs of experiments, in which understanding the 
process of fabricating, that is the question of “how” instead of why we produce, becomes the 
utmost importance, as the process is understood as how a thing comes into being.266 This “how” 
is pursued from the standpoint outside the earth, and is applied back into things as if anything, 
such as nature, is “potentially man-made,”267 even if such process is violent. 268 However, 
Arendt argues that what this initiation of process makes possible does not lie in our activity of 
work but lies in our ability of action, which has the nature of unpredictability and irreversibility. 
What Arendt draws attention to here is modern science’s infusion of action into work, which she 
describes as “the great dangers of acting in the mode of making.”269 In other words, the mixture 
of action and work initiates something (process) with the confidence of absolute control—as if 
everything is possible. However, what Arendt precisely warns is that there is a limit in action; we 
cannot control the outcome and undo the things we initiated through action:   
Modern natural science and technology, which no longer observe or take material from or 
imitate processes of nature but seem actually to act into it, seem, by the same token, to 
have carried irreversibility and human unpredictability into the natural realm, where no 
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remedy can be found to undo what has been done.270 
 
For Arendt, activating the process by which homo faber fabricated into nature symbolizes the 
beginning of modern world, as seen in the example of the atomic engineer.271 Irreversible change 
into the earth where all life is always conditioned is certainly problematic, as our society is 
currently witnessing numerous ecological consequences from such irreversible actions into 
nature.  
Arendt argues that the distrust of our given anthropocentric and geocentric conditions in 
modern science is what leads to earth alienation of modernity. Alienation from earth is an act of 
uprooting in order to acquire the no-body’s perspective anywhere in the universe. When people 
apply “cosmic laws as guiding principles for terrestrial action,” 272 arguably such actions seem to 
be literally out of place—unsituated. This is the reason why Arendt describes one of the 
phenomena of alienation as “flight from the earth into the universe.”273 In such a condition, we 
act like “dwellers of the universe,”274 who can think, act, and move freely “in terms of the 
universe while remaining on the earth,”275 while disregarding the given conditions of our earthly 
and worldly existence.276 This alienation refers to not only ontological and epistemological 
alienation from the earth as earth-bound creatures, but arguably also from ethics as earth-bound 
creatures. As discussed in Chapter 2, anti-anthropocentrism, or alienation from the fundamental 
conditions of our bodily and earthly existence challenges the very possibility of ethics.   
Furthermore, another significance of the discoveries of Galileo’s telescope is that this 
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universal standpoint of the Archimedean point became available to the sense perception of our 
earthly beings, despite the realization of the limits of bodily sense-perception for receiving 
truth.277 That is, the telescope made it possible for any-body to perceive the secrets of the planet; 
the telescope becomes the lens of the universalized viewpoint that is readily translatable to our 
human sense experience. The viewpoint is literally universal as it “must be comprehensible to 
the point of imitation by somebody who is able to occupy the same location.”278 As I discussed 
before, the existence of the plurality of perspectives is the precondition of uniqueness, that 
“being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees 
and hears from a different position.”279 Thus, this idea and implementation of a unified 
perspective threatens the plurality of our common world. 
Needless to say, such ambition for a universal viewpoint is already contradictory given 
the fact that we are always embodied earthly beings. Arendt articulates this by quoting Franz 
Kafka, who says of humans that “he found the Archimedean point, but he used it against 
himself”; the ironical point being that “it seems that he was permitted to find it only under this 
condition.”280 That is, given this earthly condition, Arendt points out that even when an astronaut 
goes into space, one will be unlikely to see “anything but [one]self and man-made things,” even 
though one “wishes to eliminate all anthropocentric considerations from [one’s] encounter with 
the non-human world around [the astronaut].”281 Due to the modern recipe of knowledge—we 
can only be certain of things that we can recreate—the willful renunciation of anthropocentric 
and geocentric conditions for objectivity does not lead anywhere but back to the conditions in 
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which our life is sustained.  
Arendt argues that this dilemma of earth-bound beings’ quest for objectivity corresponds 
to the rise of Cartesian doubt through which philosophy is alienated not only from the earth but 
from the common world. Descartes, who put everything in doubt, including any experiences 
derived from bodily sense-perceptions and common-sense knowledge (perhaps also the tradition), 
famously sought certainty first in his existence. Nothing is able to escape from Cartesian doubt, 
and if everything is doubtful, the activity of doubting cannot be assurance of reality, but only of 
the doubting self.282 In this sense, Arendt explains that the Archimedean point, the view outside 
the earth for universality, has to be brought down to this doubting self where certainty is derived 
from; that is, this is not a return to earth-bound sensual beings, but specifically to the inner 
conscious activity of mind. What this radical distrust of everything brought in the Cartesian 
doubt is introspection. The certainty no longer found out there in the world nor in space, but only 
found in the consciousness of the self. This radical shift in sense-making location from the world 
into the self is another aspect of world alienation,283 in which what binds us together is not the 
world, but “the structure of [our] minds” are only thing that may remain as the common.284 In 
this sense, along with the loss of stable worldliness through the rise of social, what this distrust 
of our shared common world through the Cartesian radical doubt brings about, for Arendt, is the 
vulnerable lonely mass population of modernity who lose the ways in which they can keep touch 
of a common sense reality and thus become more susceptible to a delusional world, failing to 
withstand against ideological movements such as totalitarianism.285  
Importantly, Arendt uses the term anthropocentric to signify that we are sensual 
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embodied beings; what we see and understand is inseparable from our bodily conditions. For 
Arendt, to be anthropocentric is to affirm our bodily conditions and limits in our quest for 
knowledge, not to say that we are the highest beings in the sense of normative 
anthropocentrism.286 To this extent, Arendt indicates that modern science, which involves in 
alienation from earth and world, is free from “all such anthropocentric, that is, truly humanistic, 
concerns.”287 This is because Arendt understands that our understandings, experiences, meanings, 
and common sense are derived from our bodily and earthly conditions.288 While her political 
theory is certainly centered around humanistic concerns, she helps us to see how it is even 
possible for us to have humanistic concerns in the first place by carefully showing each of the 
conditions of our mortal, earth-bound existence. Thus, Arendt criticizes the negation of 
perceptual anthropocentric conditions of our life and world, as it actually means the negation of 
humanity itself.289 That is, there seems to be a vital link between affirming sense perception and 
co-constituting our common world.  
Jerome Kohn provides very insightful analysis of two alienations in the light of Adolf 
Eichmann as follows: 
What Arendt probably did not know is that Adolf Eichmann, when asked by the Israeli 
police why he changed his mind about the murderous, world-destructive racist ideology 
whose logic he carried out to the letter during World War II, replied: ‘To tell the truth, it 
took a rocket landing on the moon. From then on, a radical change went on inside me.’ 
Eichmann’s past had become as distant from him as the moon, which puts in a nutshell 
what Arendt means by the human crisis of world- and earth-alienation.290 
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As the word radical derives from the meaning of “root” radix in Latin, Eichmann seemed to 
remove the root that connects us to the earth by launching into the Moon. If this rootedness is a 
condition for us to co-constitute our common world where we partake in meaning-making, the 
radical removal, or alienation from the earth is certainly dangerous.   
What alienation from the earth and followingly from the world brought about seems to be 
crisis for situated cohabitation—we can no longer be sure how we can live together on the earth 
and in the world. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Donna Haraway makes a very important point that 
scientific objectivity—being nowhere—is actually equivalent to the attempt to be everywhere in 
the hopes of searching for “translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality.”291 
Following Haraway, the multiplicity of perspectives of the world is reduced and squeezed into 
one standardized and universal language. Arendt calls out such replacement of language (and 
therefore speech) as devoid of meaningfulness.292 Scientific objectivity is as problematic as 
relativism because in equalizing our positioning, we fail to account for where we stand, see, and 
speak.293  
Arguably, alienation from the earth and the world, and the link between them helps us to 
understand our ecological crisis. As Arendt discusses in The Life of the Mind, the commonality 
among all living beings is “to live in a world that preceded one’s own arrival and will survive 
one’s own departure.”294 Our ecological crisis cannot certainly take this constant flow of arrival 
and departure of species as granted. Rather, it is problematic to believe that species eternally 
thrive effortlessly. As we know, our arrival into and departure from this world is absolutely not 
due to mere effort of our own species by itself, and we certainly cannot come to exist without 
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many earthly factors. There are numerous forms of interdependency in our earthly and worldly 
existence, which I discuss later in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Conclusion: Ecological Crisis  
About sixty years after Sputnik, Paul Crutzen famously named our new geological era as 
the Anthropocene, which signifies the dominant influence and impact of human activities in 
geology and ecology that arguably exceed and alter natural cycles.295 What signifies the 
Anthropocene is that a significant amount of human artificial things, such as toxic chemicals and 
plastics, have made their way into the geological record and have exceedingly disrupted and 
disturbed the natural cycle. A recent article also claimed that microplastics were found in human 
placenta.296 Although every instance of contamination may not be intentional, the Anthropocene 
reflects Arendt’s analysis of “acting into nature,” as the earth is more and more filled with 
artificial materials to the level that the earth “for the first time ha[s been] taken…into the human 
world.”297   
While I am not here to deny the importance of scientific contributions in mitigating our 
ecological crisis per se, from our previous reading of Arendt, the remarks of Crutzen evokes 
Arendt’s critiques of modern technology and science: 
A daunting task lies ahead for scientists and engineers to guide society towards 
environmentally sustainable management during the era of the Anthropocene. This will 
require appropriate human behavior at all scales, and may well involve internationally 
accepted, large-scale geo-engineering projects, for instance to ‘optimize’ climate.”298 
 
The quote suggests that the survival of our human species or the fate of this planet itself seems to 
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lie in management by a few groups of specialists such as scientists and engineers, but not in the 
plurality of people. The fact that these specialists (and perhaps any-body) are technologically 
advanced enough to grasp the earth from the outside (e.g., satellite) and to apply the knowledge 
back into the earth to engineer the earth certainly reminds us of the Archimedean standpoint that 
Arendt critiques. Moreover, such management calls for a shift from human actions to mere 
human behavior on a mass scale. By applying the Archimedean point onto ourselves, as Arendt 
says, our existences will be reduced into something like a “behaving animal.”299 This is exactly 
why Arendt critiques the scientific triumph of the Archimedean standpoint; acquiring this god-
like position—seeing from far above—undermines the condition of plurality. 
However, Arendt’s critique of modernity is likewise not anti-scientific nor anti-
technological development. Due to blurred tradition and the radical alienation from earth and 
world together, the problem for Arendt is that we will “forever be unable to understand . . . to 
think and speak about things which nevertheless we are able to do.”300 In other words, the 
concern is the inability to address things politically even though the things at stake are affecting 
our fundamental conditions of plurality. Arendt clearly warns that such scientific and 
technological developments should be a political question for the people but not technocrats.301  
Although, as discussed in Chapter 2, Arendt does not directly address ecological crisis 
per se, her careful analysis of the vita activa and modernity can provide a novel insight into it. 
What I draw from Arendt is that being earth-bound is not a trivial matter, but it should be the 
condition for our inquiry (including scientific and philosophical), ethics, and politics. 
Acknowledging that we are always already earth-bound beings is one of the indispensable ways 
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to take care of the common-meeting ground of the world. The challenge is that although we are 
always already earth-bound, it is not the case that we inherently know how to live on the earth. 
As Arendt says that we “live on the earth and inhabit the world,”302 we also need the world, 
which consists of generational experience and knowledge of making the earth our home. I 
interpret this to mean that we have to learn to live on the earth and in the world. In Chapter 4, I 
address how our ecological crisis consists of the loss of the world, as seen in the homogenization 
of the diverse biocultural knowledge through globalization, destruction of traditions, generational 
experience and knowledge of living in the land, such as traditional ecological knowledge (TEK). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRIMES AGAINST THE EARTH: THROUGH ARENDT, BUTLER, AND ROZZI 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at expanding the ecological reading of Hannah Arendt’s political 
theory through analysis of Judith Butler and Ricardo Rozzi, in order to address the social and 
ecological conditions of plurality, Arendt’s central political concept. In the previous chapters, I 
showed that Arendt’s analysis of earth and world alienation offers a rich perspective on the 
ecological crisis through examining the conditions of living together with others on the earth and 
in the world. Arendt contends that earth alienation, the denial of human earthly and bodily 
condition for the pursuit of a universal standpoint, paves the way for modern science to conquer 
the earth. Furthermore, in the pursuit of objectivity, modern science undermines the common 
world, which is the locus of our shared meanings, understandings, and common sense; world 
alienation means to Arendt the loss of home for humanity. For Arendt, humanity is made 
possible through the fact that each of us speaks and acts from our own locality in the presence of 
plural perspectives; our plurality is possible only if we are situated in the earth and world. These 
are her proposed political conditions of living with others in plurality. 
However, Arendt’s theory of plurality does not sufficiently address the social and 
ecological aspects of human conditions. Although Arendt strongly emphasizes the fact that we 
are earth-bound beings (in the sense that we literally cannot live without earthly conditions), her 
perspective does not give sufficient attention to the fact that our existences are also bound to the 
innumerous existences of other-than-human entities ecologically. Furthermore, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, Arendt’s view of the earth (as seen her analysis of labor) does not see the “geographic 
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difference and the uniqueness of living in particular places.”303 That is, it lacks a view of 
biocultural relationships. Likewise, ecological crisis often entails socio-political injustices, the 
power struggles of people. Some of such struggle derives from the dominant view that reduces 
the land to mere space (or resources) rather than viewing it as place. Thus, I argued in Chapter 2 
that abstract theories of ecological crisis fail to take account of the differentially embodied 
conditions and sociopolitical experiences of people. Arendt’s theory alone is limited in 
understanding our social and ecological conditions of vulnerability and interdependent 
relationships, and such factors should be accounted for in the conditions of living together with 
others.  
Thus, in this chapter, I supplement Arendt’s account with that of Butler, who critiques 
and expands Arendt’s political theory to create a more socially and ecologically accountable one. 
Butler (2015) criticizes Arendt’s dichotomy between the public and private, which fails to reflect 
our social conditions of precariousness and interdependency. With that in mind, drawing from 
Arendt’s political theory, Butler proposes an ethics of plurality, the ethics of cohabitation, which 
signifies that our human plurality mandates that we cannot choose those with whom we cohabit. 
This unchosen nature of cohabitation is drawn from Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963): any act of 
the eradication of groups of people from the earth, i.e., genocide, is an attempt to destroy the 
condition of human plurality, which Arendt calls a crime against humanity.304 Butler’s normative 
understanding of plurality, unchosen cohabitation, is not only a matter of humanity, but she 
suggests that the ethics of unchosen cohabitation should go beyond the scales of human-
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communities and include Earth, saying “I seek to offer an ecological supplement to Arendt’s 
anthropocentrism.”305  
In response to Butler’s ecological charge, I introduce Rozzi’s analysis of biocultural 
ethics. Rozzi argues that habit (ethics) is a co-evolutionary development through the interrelation 
of co-inhabitants in the habitat. In other words, to live is not simply a matter of dwelling, but 
living concerns the relationship among co-inhabitants, habitats, and habits: the ways in which 
people live together with other-than-human entities in a place. Following Rozzi’s analysis, I 
argue that we should be concerned not only with the eradication of any group of people but also 
the eradication of the ways that people dwell and engage in their environments. Moreover, we 
should also be concerned with the eradication of other-than-human species and environments 
themselves. In this light, I argue that the loss of biocultural diversity (including linguistic 
diversity), the world phenomena of rapid extinction of species, and ecocide can be understood as 
a crime against humanity, and perhaps even crimes against the Earth, if we can come to 
understand the condition of innumerous interdependencies that we have as inhabitants of Earth.  
4.2 Judith Butler on Arendt: Performative Politics of Plurality 
In this section, I briefly introduce Butler’s overall project of the book Notes Toward a 
Performative Theory of Assembly (2015), in order to clarify how her contributions intersect with 
this dissertation. I argue that Butler’s project not only helps us see the limits of Arendt’s theory 
but also offers an expanded theory of plurality with an ethical framework that can account for the 
social and ecological conditions of our existences.  
In Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler examines the recent events 
of public assemblies in many different parts of the world, some of which take place against the 
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backdrop of neoliberal economic and political systems that produce and sustain a system in 
which a certain population of lives are treated as disposable.306 Demonstration has been used in 
many parts of the world as a form of protest and resistance of the people, and as a matter of fact, 
demonstration serves to constitute “the people” in a moment. And yet, this democratic enactment 
of “the people,” despite its aspiration, often becomes the site of political struggle, as some 
populations are more precarious than others. For example, the very act of gathering in a public 
space exposes the vulnerability of certain bodies, as seen in the Black Lives Matter movement, 
as such public space is often the domain of state power and violence. Butler’s analysis focuses 
on such enactment of “the people” through assemblies, as well as the meanings of such 
assemblies, as a locus to expose the precarious existences of bodies.307 Butler uses her 
performativity theory along with Arendt’s notion of the space of appearance to argue that public 
assemblies are the very enactment of a performative politics of plurality.  
First, let me clarify how Butler’s performativity theory intersects with Arendt’s political 
theory. As discussed in Chapter 3, Arendt’s political theory is rooted in plurality. Her sense of 
political agency is relational, which breaks from her predecessors in political theory, who tended 
to depict a human as “an abstract subject that existed only in the singular” in their theories.308 As 
Arendt notes “man is apolitical . . . . Politics arises in what lies between men and is established as 
relationships,”309 Arendt’s political agency is always situated in the innumerable web of human 
relationship. Politics is made possible only when people come to appear through speech and 
action in the presence of plural others. Through such concerted actions alone, but not bounded by 
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affiliations, identities, nor attributes, the public space can be constituted, and this is what Arendt 
calls the space of appearance.310 In other words, the space of appearance is not just a matter of 
appearing but is conditioned by being seen and heard by others from each irreducible unique 
perspective. To this extent, Arendt’s political agency also breaks from the self-sufficient view of 
agency, because self-disclosure through action and speech in the public sphere is uncontrollable, 
since it always relies on others’ ability to perceive: we are not able to control whether, how, and 
by whom we are perceived. Arendt’s sense of freedom is distinguished from the ability to control 
(i.e., sovereignty), as freedom is conditioned by and produced by the concerted actions of the 
people; and this “people” cannot be a homogenized body, as politics is always conditioned in 
irreducible plurality.311 To this extent, as Emma Ingala puts it, “the space of appearance proves 
to be fundamentally performative,”312 as neither the space of appearance nor political actors are a 
given stable sphere or identity but are performatively produced.  
For Butler, when we say things are produced performatively, such performative 
production must be distinguished from construction in the sense of “a singular or deliberate 
‘act’,”313 because the enactment of things comes to matter through “the reiterative and citational 
practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names.”314 In other words, the process in 
which a person comes to appear and is recognized as a human subject is inseparable from the 
discourse (including material, linguistic, and historical manifestations) of a human subject, 
because such regulatory terms such as human and subject produce the margins from which 
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bodies can be registered, excluded, and denied. In this sense, the body may appear to be the 
passive material that regulatory norms like gender are placed on. However, for Butler, our bodies 
are not merely passive materials but come to “matter” (in both the senses of “to materialize” and 
“to mean”) through regulatory norms like gender, as the norms (in order to be activated) need to 
be expressed through reiterative performances.315 For example, “a human subject” is not merely 
a linguistic construction of the ideal; however, various modes and expressions of bodily 
existences (which are associated with categories such as sexuality, gender, disability, etc.) 
repetitively and discursively produce, shape, and yet sometimes fail to meet the regulatory norm 
of the “human subject.”316 Through the repetitive and discursive process of such mattering, our 
bodies enact and reproduce sociocultural norms, such as gender, at both conscious and 
unconscious levels. 
Then, what Butler’s contributions signify here is that the performative production of a 
human subject is inseparable from normative discourse, such as in the case of gender. Butler 
explains that: 
the performativity of gender presumes a field of appearance in which gender appears, and 
a scheme of recognizability within which gender shows up in the ways that it does; and 
since the field of appearance is regulated by norms of recognition that are themselves 
hierarchical and exclusionary, the performativity of gender is thus bound up with the 
differential ways in which subjects become eligible for recognition. Recognizing a gender 
depends fundamentally on whether there is a mode of presentation for that gender, a 
condition for its appearance . . . .317  
 
Thus, for Butler, who can be recognized as a subject is produced performatively, as the ways in 
which our bodies can appear and be recognized are always caught up with obligatory norms like 
gender. This means that even though everyone ideally should be able to become an equally 
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recognizable subject in the politics of plurality, the realm of appearance is also a regulatory space 
of recognition where certain people are not recognized.318 However, Butler argues that through 
repetitive citational process, norms can wear out and their margins can possibly expand; thus, 
“even as norms seem to determine which genders can appear and which cannot, they also fail to 
control the sphere of appearance, operating more like absent or fallible police than effective 
totalitarian powers.”319 Thus, Butler’s performativity theory is not a strictly descriptive theory 
but is a performative praxis as it can expand a “more possible and more livable” space for those 
who are at the margins.320 Like Arendt, Butler configures politics as plural performative actions. 
Butler argues that Arendt’s politics of plurality can make it possible for those who are stateless to 
seek “the right to have rights” through plural performative actions such as assembly and 
resistance.321 In this sense, Butler, drawing from Arendt, sees that assemblies of people are the 
very example of performative politics of plurality, like the space of appearance, as they are 
“exercising a right to appear, to exercise freedom.”322 However, what Butler elucidates more 
clearly than Arendt is that the space of appearance is not struggle-free, because normative 
production and recognition are always in negotiation with power.323  
If the space of appearance is a realm of the recognizable, and if the norms of recognizable 
and unrecognizable forms are produced performatively through a negotiation of power, then the 
space of appearance is an embodiment of political struggle. And when being seen and heard, i.e., 
recognized is the condition for political enactment of action, then, the issue is quite obvious that 
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this recognition itself ought to be a political matter.324 Butler’s performativity theory helps us to 
understand how the realm of appearance is entangled with the power-dynamics of recognition, 
and how such understanding is important for us to discuss the politics of plurality—living with 
others. Thus, Butler asks, “Who enters this plurality, and who does not, and how are such matters 
decided?”325 This critical point is where Butler can expand Arendt’s politics of plurality. 
4.2.1 Precarious Bodies and Performative Bodies 
Another reason Butler draws from Arendt is Arendt’s refusal of expressive identity-based 
politics. Arendt’s understanding of identity here means the “who-ness” instead of “what-ness” of 
our existence. As discussed in Chapter 3, distinctive and unique existence, i.e., identity can only 
be attained through action in the public realm. As Bonnie Honig puts it, “on Arendt’s account, 
identity is the performative production[,] not the expressive condition or essence of action.”326 
For Arendt, expressive identities such as ethnicity, racial, sexual, gender, and economic status 
cannot be the shared expressive condition of pursuing freedom in plurality, as these identity 
politics may become “insidious resources for the homogenizing control of behavior and the 
silencing of independent criticism.”327 Besides, these identities are private to the extent that they 
are associated with necessity and the private realm328 (in the sense of “a given fact, not to be 
made or acted upon”329). To clarify this point: this, however, does not mean that women, for 
example, cannot enter the public realm; rather the constitution of the public realm, for Arendt, 
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should not rely on the whatness of people (i.e., constative identities), but on the unexpected 
unfolding of who-ness. Honig clarifies this point very clearly: 
From Arendt’s perspective, a political community that constitutes itself on the basis of a 
prior, shared, and stable identity threatens to close the space of politics, to homogenize or 
repress the plurality and multiplicity that political action postulates.330 
 
In the eyes of Arendt then, contemporary identity politics (such as Black Lives Matter, 
Women’s March, Occupy Movement) may appear to be a symptomatic phenomenon of the rise 
of the social, where affiliation-based bodily needs and wants (racial, gender, and economic 
concerns) “invade” the political space. As Honig says, “this feature of Arendt’s work, combined 
with the public/private distinction upon which it is mapped, have led feminist critics of Arendt to 
fault her for theorizing a politics that is in inhospitable to women and women’s issues.”331 This, 
of course, raises an important concern regarding the tension between the need to recognize 
injustice experienced by certain communities and the needs of plural politics, where each of us 
will not be reduced into a homogenized body. Honig continues, “the problem is that Arendt 
grounds that rejection in a refusal to treat private-realm identities, like gender, as potential sites 
of politicization.”332 In other words, Arendt perceives that issues that are politicized in the name 
of certain identities not only falsely appropriate the political sphere but also fail to recognize that 
identities like gender are personal and given. However, both Honig and Butler propose that 
Arendt’s refusal of an expressive identity politics, through a critical reading, may be able to 
overcome this tension. 
Butler writes that Arendt understands the public sphere to be a domain of independence 
in which bodily concerns should not enter, even though the very speaking actor of the public 
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sphere is embodied. Butler points out that the group of equals in the public is seen in the image 
of independent, able, and perhaps male bodies, reflecting the traditional and social gender roles. 
On the other hand, these characteristic of bodies in the private realm mirror what the public 
bodies are not, such as dependent, the disabled, elderly, childish, and feminine.333 For Arendt, 
the condition of entering the public sphere lies in leaving “these necessitarian, life-sustaining 
concerns behind,” as such is “the mark of their capacity to act.”334 Ultimately, the population of 
those who cannot afford to handle their life matters also cannot afford entry into the domain of 
freedom; justice, equality, and freedom turn out to be exclusive property of the few privileged in 
the public sphere.335 Butler thus concludes that “if the body remains at the level of necessity, 
then it would appear that no political account of freedom can be an embodied one.”336 Butler’s 
contributions toward Arendt is the reinterpretation of bodies in order to amend the gap between 
freedom and necessity “from the point of view of the [politically and economically induced] 
unequal demographic distribution of precarity.”337 
Echoing Arendt, for Butler, identity politics, despite the legitimacy of its struggles, “fails 
to furnish a broader conception of what it means, politically, to live together, across differences, 
sometimes in modes of unchosen proximity, especially when living together… remains an 
ethical and political imperative.”338 Assemblies are often formed by people with specific 
interests or demands, or by people who share proximate experiences, such as gender and racial 
inequality. That is, such intentionality of assemblies may be described as identity politics, which 
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can be at odds with plurality. Butler’s aim of her book is precisely not to reduce assemblies as an 
expression of identity politics but reinterpret them as that of precarious bodies that demand “for a 
more livable set of lives.”339 According to Butler, precarious existence is what we all share 
among us, as we are social and bodily beings that rely on others, materials, and social institutions. 
However, she continues, that the distribution of precariousness differs among us, because 
precarity is a “politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing 
social and economic networks of support more than others, and become differentially exposed to 
injury, violence, and death.”340 In overcoming the tension between identity politics and plural 
politics, Butler proposes precarity “as a site of alliance among groups of people who do not 
otherwise find much in common and between whom there is sometimes even suspicion and 
antagonism.”341 In other words, Butler’s project expands the Arendtian sense of performative 
action to performative politics of bodies, to argue that concerted actions of precarious bodies 
themselves “express their indignation and . . . enact their plural existence in public space.”342 
Butler points out that the only forms of bodies that can appear in Arendt’s sense of the 
public space are speaking and acting bodies “as a mode of thinking and judging,”343 which is 
distinguished from bodily existence as a form of necessity in the private realm. The issue Butler 
poses is precisely about the duality of bodies in Arendt’s political theory, which fails to see that 
bodies in the private sphere are performative productions; Arendt’s theory sees the body as the 
symbol of necessity and as constative, and that such bodily demands (hunger, gender, sexualities, 
etc.) should be barred from the site of performative becoming. As Honig elaborates on Butler, 
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what Butler’s performativity theory does is “to unmask identities that aspire to successful 
constation, to deauthorize and redescribe them as performative productions by identifying spaces 
that escape or resist identitarian administration, regulation, and expression.”344 Butler’s gender 
performativity helps us understand that such identities associated with the private realm are not 
inherent but performative productions.  
This is precisely the point where Butler departs from Arendt because “that Arendtian 
presupposition from The Human Condition presumes that the body does not enter into the speech 
act.”345 This Arendtian speaking and acting body needs to leave behind the other aspects of our 
bodily existence, i.e., embodiment, in order to enter the public realm. This interpretation suggests 
that action arises not from bodies, but from relinquishment of bodily concern, thus falling into a 
dichotomy between bodies and mind as necessity and freedom, respectively.346 Thus, Butler 
argues: 
If action is defined as independent, implying a fundamental difference from dependency, 
then our self-understanding as actors is predicated upon a disavowal of those living and 
interdependent relations upon which our lives depend.”347 
 
That is, what Butler problematizes in Arendt’s view of political actors is the absence or exclusion 
of bodily needs and conditions for the enactment of freedom, which fails to understand the fact 
that our social and ecological interdependent relationships sustain not only our lives but our 
actions.348 Butler elaborates followingly:  
Only in the context of a living world does the human as an agentic creature emerge, one 
whose dependency on others and on living processes gives rise to the very capacity for 
action. Living and acting are bound together in such a way that the conditions that make 
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it possible for anyone to live are part of the very object of political reflection and 
action.349 
 
Butler’s point here is that the politics of plurality needs to take account of our social and 
ecological conditions of precarious existences and interdependency, and such embodied 
conditions, but not identities, can form certain ethical obligations in and for the politics of 
plurality.350  
4.2.2 The Ethic of Cohabitation and Crimes Against Humanity 
As Butler and Honig show, Arendt’s understanding of the formation of political agency 
lacks the contextuality of bodily existence as embedded in social and ecological material 
conditions and interdependency. If the politics of plurality concerns living with others, then not 
only the condition of “with,” but also both “living” and “others” ought to be the subject of 
rigorous political questioning. Who and what are included and neglected in these “others”? As 
discussed in Chapter 3, if this “living” needs to resist alienation from the earth and world, then 
how is such situated cohabitation possible? What if this very possibility of “living” (as well as 
acting) is sustained in the web of innumerous relationships with others? What ethical obligations 
will emerge in the pursuit of plural politics? 
Although Arendt may lack in elucidating the power-dynamics of the space of appearance 
and in grasping embodied freedom (that does not disown marginalized populations), Arendt’s 
political theory still offers something very important. As previously discussed, Arendt’s plurality 
does not come to be through prior agreements or shared identities. Butler reads Arendt’s basis for 
plural politics as “the unchosen character of earthly cohabitation.”351 What this means, according 
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to Butler is, that the politics of plurality ethically demands that “no one has the prerogative to 
choose with whom to cohabit the earth.”352  In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt condemns the 
Jerusalem trial of Adolf Eichmann for not grasping the nature of the crime that Eichmann 
committed. In her eyes, the Nazi’s genocide of Jewish people is not merely a crime against the 
Jewish people, as the Nazis believed they were entitled to choose which population should live 
on the earth. 
It was when the Nazi regime declared that the German people not only were unwilling to 
have any Jews in Germany but wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from 
the face of the earth that the new crime, the crime against humanity—in the sense of a 
crime “against the human status,” or against the very nature of mankind—appeared.353 
 
For Arendt, the crime against humanity, even though the crime was “perpetrated upon the body 
of the Jewish people,”354 is the proper name for such an act of genocide. That is, plurality is 
conditioned by the premise of not granting anybody or any institution the power to decide which 
members are worthy/unworthy of cohabitation with on the earth, and the violation of such 
premise is a crime against humanity.355 In response to Arendt’s unchosen nature of plural 
cohabitation, Butler claims that that Arendt’s contribution can “serve the basis of our 
obligation”356 toward “open-ended plurality.”357 Butler argues that our obligatory opposition to 
practices and institutions against open-ended plurality should acknowledge the struggle against 
precarity as an indispensable part of such open-ended plurality, because “precarity is 
indissociable from that dimension of politics that addresses the organization and protection of 
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bodily needs.”358 That is, for Butler, preserving the life of unchosen members of cohabitation 
takes the critical lens of precarity to understand the embodied struggle toward plurality. 
Although Arendt herself does not intend to offer a normative account of plurality, Butler 
suggests that Arendt’s theory actually offers “an ethical view of cohabitation that serves as a 
guideline for particular forms of politics.”359 In this sense, plurality is a political and ethical 
commitment to live together with others. 
Again, this “living” and “others” should be our open-ended inquiry for such ethics and 
politics. Butler questions both in the context of agency: 
If we are living organisms who speak and act, then we are clearly related to a vast 
continuum or network of living beings; we not only live among them, but our persistence 
as living organisms depends on that matrix of sustaining interdependent relations.360 
 
Although Arendt’s ethical and political cohabitation are for humanity, as Butler’s contributions 
show, the ethics of unchosen earthly cohabitation should concern our interdependent 
relationships with other-than-human entities and the earth.361 If the ethics and politics of plurality 
does not presume a collective identity, then the exclusive and abstract identity of “human” as a 
given condition of politics seems to be an odd assumption, especially when such a regulatory 
norm is produced performatively. As Butler argues, then what it presumes is “a set of enabling 
and dynamic relations that include support, dispute, breakage, joy, and solidarity.”362 This set of 
enabling and dynamic relations is, of course, inseparable from innumerable interdependent 
relationships with other-than-humans on the earth. Putting these innumerable relationships into 
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the context of Chapter 3, alienation from the earth should include alienation from these earthly 
co-inhabitants.  
Then, if the eradication of a group of people from the earth is a crime against humanity, 
then what about the elimination of diverse ways that people live on the earth? As Butler’s 
reading of Arendt shows, if appearing and being recognized in the public is an indispensable 
condition of plural politics, and if the ways in which people can appear and be recognized are 
entangled in a matrix of discourses, then we should be concerned about the enabling and 
disabling conditions of ways certain people can appear and be recognized. And these enabling 
and disabling conditions should be investigated not from an abstract human identity, but from 
diverse embodied entities that depend “on that matrix of sustaining interdependent relations.”363 
In extending Butler’s reading of Arendt through her theories of precarity and gender 
performativity, I argue then that eliminating the conditions in which diverse ways of living and 
appearing are sustained is a crime against humanity—perhaps a crime against earth. In order to 
explore such argument, I would like to focus on the elimination of biocultural diversity. In the 
following section, I examine these points through the work of Ricardo Rozzi, who discusses the 
link between biological and cultural homogenization. 
4.3 Biocultural Diversity for the Politics of Plurality 
In this section, I introduce the work of Ricardo Rozzi, focusing on his conceptions of 
biocultural ethics and biocultural homogenization. In doing so, I show why not only the 
eradication of groups of people but also the elimination of the conditions of diverse ways of 
living and appearing (which includes biocultural diversity) is a matter of concern for plurality. In 
this section I thus analyze the interrelationship between biocultural diversity and the politics of 
 
363 Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, p. 86. 
89 
plurality. While biocultural diversity is often discussed in the context of sustainability, there is 
not much discussion of biocultural diversity in the context of plural politics.364 Following 
Butler’s claim that the normative accounts of plural politics needs to be grounded in precarity 
and interdependency, this section focuses on socio-ecological interdependency through a 
biocultural lens.  
4.3.1 Rozzi’s Biocultural Ethics and Homogenization 
Rozzi proposes an ethical framework that is grounded in a biocultural lens.365 This 
conceptual lens sits opposite to the binary understanding that the biosphere and culture are two 
distinct realms as if they exist independently. Rather, a biocultural lens perceives a co-
evolutionary interrelationship between these two realms such that, for example, cultural diversity 
cannot be separated from biological diversity. In this light, Luisa Maffi, a leading scholar of 
biocultural conservation, describes that “biocultural diversity comprises the diversity of life in all 
of its manifestations—biological, cultural and linguistic—which are interrelated (and likely co-
evolved) within a complex socio-ecological adaptive system.”366 
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Sustainable Development Goals,” Environmental Values 27 (2018): 55–80. Also in “Biocultural Approaches to 
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See Jan Janspach et al., “Biocultural Approaches to Sustainability: A Systematic Review of the Scientific 
Literature,” People and Nature 2, no. 3 (2020): 643–59. 
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Mean When They Use the Term Biocultural?,” American Anthropologist 118, no. 3 (2016): 554–69. 
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Rozzi uses the conceptual framework to propose a biocultural ethics that “ontologically 
and axiologically” takes account of “the interrelations between the Habits and the Habitats that 
shape the identities and well-being of co-in-Habitants.”367 Rozzi calls this the 3Hs model of 
biocultural ethics.368 His reasoning behind this proposal is his critique of modern ethics, which 
perceives humans as detached placeless beings, like what Arendt would call “the dwellers of 
universe.”369 Rozzi critiques that “modern ethics has decoupled human habits from the habitats 
where they take place, as if humans and their identities could exist in isolation from their habitats 
and other-than-human co-inhabitants.”370 In other words, modern ethics fails to perceive habitats, 
as well as our interrelation with co-inhabitants of the habitat, as ontologically integral 
components of our ways of living (inhabiting).  
Rozzi locates this issue of decoupling in his analysis of the Greek word ethos, which the 
term ethics is drived from. He analyzes the archaic meaning of ethos, which used to include the 
meaning of “den,” as a place where animals and humans dwell, in addition to the meaning of 
customary habits.371 Thus, Rozzi argues that the archaic account of ethos comprises two things: 
habitats (of animal and human inhabitants) and habits.372 However, Rozzi points out that the 
Aristotelian usage of the term ethos lost the meaning of habitats—both for animal and humans. 
 
367 Ricardo Rozzi, “Introduction to Integrating Philosophy and Ecology: Biocultural Interfaces,” in Linking Ecology 
and Ethics for a Changing World: Values, Philosophy, and Action, eds. Ricardo Rozzi et al., vol. 1 of Ecology and 
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368 Rozzi, “Introduction to Integrating Philosophy and Ecology,” p.  4. 
369 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 3. 
370 Ricardo Rozzi, “Biocultural Ethics: Recovering the Vital Links between the Inhabitants, Their Habits, and 
Habitats,” Environmental Ethics 34 (Spring 2012): 27. As I am going to cite the two of works from Rozzi that are 
identical for abbreviated citation for footnotes, I will cite this source as Rozzi (2012), “Biocultural Ethics” here after, 
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371 Rozzi (2012), “Biocultural Ethics,” pp. 39–40.  
372 Ibid.; Ricardo Rozzi, “Biocultural Ethics: From Biocultural Homogenization Toward Biocultural Conservation,” 
in Linking Ecology and Ethics for a Changing World: Values, Philosophy, and Action, edited by Ricardo Rozzi et al., 
vol. 1 of Ecology and Ethics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 20–21. I cite this source as Rozzi (2013), “Biocultural 
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Rather it came to solely focus on human habits in the light of civic life in a polis.373 Rozzi 
criticizes that modern Eurocentric ethics follows the Aristotelian reductive notion of ethos, 
which does not consider the interrelationships between the habitats and habits of human and 
other-than-human inhabitants. As seen in the practices of colonialism, this view assumes certain 
habits should be applied and cultivated universally despite the existence of diverse local 
habitats.374  
Thus, Rozzi proposes that ethics should recover the original meaning of ethos, which 
refers to “both the place where one lives [with others] and the ways in which one lives.”375 By 
applying an ecological lens to the original meaning of ethos, Rozzi lays out the descriptive and 
normative conceptual framework of the interrelations among habitats, habits, and co-inhabitants 
in the 3Hs model of biocultural ethics. These three Hs are, however, not reduced to the 
biophysical sphere. According to Rozzi, habitat consists of three dimensions: biophysical, 
symbolic-linguistic, and sociopolitical.376 In corresponding to habitat, habit is also 
multidimensional, and it includes but is not limited to, biological, sociological, epistemological, 
and ethical practices.377 Lastly, the conception of co-inhabitants represents not only human and 
other-than-human nature living in the habitat, but importantly signifies the fact that inhabitants 
share the habitat in “an ecological-evolutionary process.”378 This is not just a matter of 
ontological reification of human existence, but Rozzi’s point here is that we have an ethical 
 
373 Rozzi (2012), “Biocultural Ethics,” p. 40; Rozzi (2013), “Biocultural Ethics,” p. 21. 
374 Rozzi (2013), “Biocultural Ethics,” p. 21. 
375 Ibid. 
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obligation toward the habitat derived from the fact that we as co-inhabitants share the habitat 
with other-than-human co-inhabitants. Rozzi claims that this ontological and axiological sense of 
sharing a habitat with other-than-human nature is not anything new but is “consistent with 
ecological worldviews of many native people, where the birds are companions with whom a 
habitat must be shared.”379 Rozzi argues that the 3Hs model of biocultural ethics allows us to 
recognize the interspecific dynamics of social and ecological injustice imposed by particular 
habits that undermine the well-being of the co-inhabitants of the habitats. 
Rozzi uses the 3Hs model of biocultural ethics as a crucial lens to understand the global 
phenomenon of biocultural homogenization. He describes biocultural homogenization as 
follows: 
Biocultural homogenization is a pervasive, but underappreciated, driver of today’s rapid 
global environmental change. It entails simultaneous and interlocked losses of native 
biological and cultural diversity at local, regional, and global scales. This process leads to 
the disruption of co-evolutionary interrelationships between cultures and their land and 
massive replacements of native biota and cultures by a few cosmopolitan species, 
languages, and cultures . . . .380 
 
Importantly, biocultural homogenization is not just about biotic homogenization or cultural 
homogenization; it allows us to perceive the interrelationship between the loss of biotic and 
cultural diversity. Furthermore, the loss of biocultural diversity through biocultural 
homogenization is not equally distributed in the world. Biocultural homogenization works 
through power-dynamics and entails injustice.381 For example, homogenization entails the 
destruction and often elimination of species and cultures that already reside in a given location. 
Rozzi argues that the disruptive replacement of local cultural habits and/or the destruction of  
habitats by cosmopolitan-and-global-economy-driven habits likely leads to the homogenization 
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of habitats and vice versa, which degrades the well-being of co-inhabitants. 
For example, Rozzi’s studies in the sub-Antarctic Magellanic ecoregion, which is one of 
the last few standings of wilderness areas in the world, show that many residents of the cities in 
the region barely know about their endemic plants but know about cosmopolitan species, such as 
apple trees and tropical palm trees, from other continents such as Asia and Europe. According to 
Rozzi, the dominant decorative trees and plants in the cities of the region are also cosmopolitan 
species, to a level that “more closely resembles the flora of the plazas in Madrid, New York, and 
Vancouver, than the flora of the forests that grow a few kilometers outside the austral cities in 
the sub-Antarctic Magellanic ecoregion.”382 Rozzi indicates that the feedback loop which leads 
to residents’ preference for cosmopolitan species over the native flora seems to homogenize the 
habitat, and such habitat reinforces the aesthetic and cultural values of the residents.383 
According to Rozzi, one of the causes of biocultural homogenization is school education. In the 
case of a school in Cuenca, Ecuador, Rozzi points out that the students are exposed to colonial 
biocultural preferences for the Spanish language inside the classroom, which ironically fails to 
fully represent local biophysical and cultural realities outside the classroom, such as the “Aymara 
and Quechua language and Amerindian cultural traditions” that “are maintained in the paramo 
outside the school.”384  
This case reflects one of the concerns that school education is associated with linguistic 
homogenization, i.e., the loss of symbolic-linguistic diversity. According to the twenty-fourth 
edition of Ethnologue, there are 7,139 different languages still spoken around the world, and 
currently twenty-eight percent of these living languages are categorized as in trouble and 
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fourteen percent as dying.385 Given this number, a little over forty percent of the world’s living 
languages are under some level of threat of extinction. In particular, their data suggests that the 
percentage of linguistic endangerment is disproportionately high in North and South America 
given the number of existing languages in each region.386 Despite these threatening conditions, 
Rozzi points out that formal school education merely covers ten percent of living languages.387 
UNESCO also indicates that many of these endangered languages are spoken by indigenous 
people, and “indigenous languages are particularly vulnerable because many of them are not 
taught at school or used in the public sphere.”388 When the public sphere (including schools) 
does not stand for multilingualism, the condition for minority language speakers to appear and be 
recognized in the public is to speak the majority language. Linguistic assimilation is a 
historically known tactic of assimilation of native populations into the dominant population in 
colonialism and imperialism. Such processes may take place through 
the imposition of the dominant language in schooling, the media, governmental affairs, 
and most other public contexts; through the denigration of the local languages and the 
cultures they embody as ‘defective,’ ‘primitive,’ unfit for the ‘modern world’; as well as 
through the severe restriction of their contexts of use and even explicit governmental 
prohibition of their use, resulting in punishment, at times corporeal, for violations.389  
 
In this sense, language assimilation opposes the politics of plurality, as only the specific 
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language speakers or ethnolinguistic groups are perceived to be appropriate political actors. 
The loss of languages also promotes further biocultural homogenization. Manuel 
Lizarralde also points out the correlation between the loss of native languages and the speakers’ 
ethnobiological knowledge and the change in their lifestyles (e.g., from subsistence living to cash 
economy) in South America.390 As we reside in the linguistic world, which shapes and influences 
the ways we understand and engage (e.g., habits) on this planet, the loss of linguistic diversity 
may lead to the loss of diverse worldviews and interrelationships among co-inhabitants.391 Luisa 
Maffi makes an important point on the loss of linguistic diversity in relation to knowledge of the 
locals:  
While not all knowledge may be linguistically encoded, language does represent the main 
tool for humans to elaborate, maintain, develop, and transmit knowledge . . . . Global 
socioeconomic change disrupts traditional ways of life, promoting poverty, population 
growth, overexploitation of the environment by outside forces and by local groups 
themselves, as well as tension and conflicts over local peoples’ land and resource rights. 
Under such conditions of rapid and drastic change, traditional knowledge, beliefs, and 
wisdom, and the languages in which they are encoded, tend to lose their functions for 
local peoples and begin to erode . . . . Furthermore, local knowledge does not “translate” 
easily into the majority languages to which minority language speakers switch. Generally, 
the replacing language does not represent an equivalent vehicle for linguistic expression 
and cultural maintenance…, and along with the dominant language usually comes a 
dominant cultural framework that begins to take over and displace the traditional one.”392 
 
Language is an integral part of the practice and conservation of traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK) of local and indigenous people. Maffi’s point about translatability is very important. As 
Rozzi’s biocultural ethics shows, if language is a coevolutionary product of long-term 
interrelationship between co-inhabitants and habitats, then the assumption that any (dominant) 
languages can “translate” any other biocultural expressions and experiences is problematic and 
 
390 Manuel Lizarralde, “Biodiversity and Loss of Indigenous Languages and Knowledge in South America,” in On 
Biocultural Diversity: Linking Language, Knowledge, and the Environment, ed. Luisa Maffi (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), pp. 265–81. 
391 Rozzi (2012), “Biocultural Ethics,” p. 34. 
392 Maffi, “Introduction,” p. 6. 
96 
short-sighted. In this sense, the assumption that science is a universal translational language of 
our diverse biocultural lived experience fails. As discussed in Chapter 2, Haraway would call 
such hunger for total translation in “the interest of unfettered power.”393 Once languages are lost, 
their speakers’ ways of livings are also lost and vice versa. Like the extinction of species, Maffi 
says that the extinction of living languages “often represents a total and irretrievable loss to their 
former speakers, and to humanity as a whole.”394  
In “Learning the Grammar of Animacy,” Robin Kimmerer beautifully and powerfully 
gives her story of recovering her ancestral language Potawatomi, which is currently spoken 
fluently only by nine people in the world.395 Her story of learning the language is not just about 
memorizing the vocabulary or grammar of the language. Her learning takes place through 
dialogues with the remaining speakers, through which she is exposed to their worldview: the 
ways in which the Potawatomi language speakers inhabit the land with other-than-human 
coinhabitants. According to Kimmerer, for example, the Potawatomi’s sense of coinhabitants 
includes many things commonly considered to be inanimate, such as rock and water, as they 
perceive that rock and water are animate beings with spirit and life, “the animacy of the world, 
the life that pulses through all things . . . .”396 Kimmerer’s story makes us realize that the 
boundary that sets who/what should be counted as coinhabitants significantly relies on the 
biocultural experiences of the people. In this sense, the extinction of Potawatomi and other 
indigenous languages may lead to the extinction of the ways in which indigenous people inhabit 
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the land with other-than-human coinhabitants; the animacy of the world, or the animacy of the 
coinhabitants will be lost.  
As Rozzi reminds us, many of these beautiful languages and worldviews are at risk of 
being replaced by dominating cultures. This replacement or homogenization is resisted through 
the struggle of the people and communities. Maffi elaborates on the political struggle of not all 
but many indigenous and local residents who rely on subsistence from the land and sea for their 
livings in the context of the interrelation between identity and language: 
indigenous and other local peoples, struggling for survival and self-determination with 
secure land bases and means of subsistence, increasingly see their languages and cultural 
traditions as essential elements in this struggle. Language, cultural traditions, and land are 
considered by most of them as equally constitutive of their identity as distinct peoples 
and of their right to live as such . . . .397 
 
Language is not merely an external tool but an integral part of who we are. As I previously 
discussed in the section on Butler, the point here is not identity politics—linguistic or ethnic 
essentialism. Rather, the point is that the ways we can appear and be recognized is a crucial 
concern for the politics of plurality. As Gloria Anzaldúa points out in “How to Tame a Wild 
Tongue,” oppression of one’s language is oppression of one’s identity, as a language can 
“communicat[e] the realities and values true to [oneself] . . . .”398 If one’s native tongues are 
under the threat of extinction from both explicit and implicit politically and economically 
sanctioned assimilation, that is not merely a threat to linguistic identity but a threat to 
performative identity in plural politics. Extending Butler’s notion of precarity, biocultural 
homogenization is a result of the politically and economically induced unequally distribution of 
precarity, where certain populations’ ways of life are deemed unworthy of institutional 
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protection. In this sense, the eradication of the diverse ways of inhabiting, expressing, and acting 
are a crime against humanity, akin to genocide itself.399 Although Arendt’s conception of natality 
gives us a hope to initiate anew despite the loss of one’s native tongue, we have to resist and 
oppose the homogenization of our plural existence. This homogenization should include the 
global phenomenon of biocultural homogenization.  
4.3.2 Crimes Against the Earth: A Case Explored through Ecocide 
As Butler proposed the ethics of unchosen cohabitation through extending Arendt’s 
politics of plurality to include every inhabitant and the earth itself,400 I would like to extend the 
crime against humanity to the Earth in order to highlight the web of enabling and dynamic 
relationships that cannot be contained in the name of humanity. As I discussed above, 
Potawatomi and other indigenous livelihoods are under the threat of global biocultural 
homogenization. This homogenization occurs not just through linguistic (or cultural habits), 
although this is one of the crucial modes of biocultural homogenization. Rozzi says that 
“biocultural homogenization does not only imply monocultures or globalized modes of living, 
but also implies an ecocide that is rapidly expanding around the planet.”401 Although Rozzi does 
not elaborate on ecocide much further in the context of biocultural homogenization, here I would 
like to focus on ecocide to elucidate its nexus with genocide and perhaps to the destruction of life 
itself. My attempt here does not mean to negate the importance of the rights of indigenous people 
and their livelihood by using the word Earth instead of humanity. Rather, my position here is to 
challenge the narrow boundary of humanity that fails to include the eradication of other-than-
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human entities and the destruction of habitats in its integral concern. I argue that ecocide is a key 
for us to understand why the rapid extinction of species and diverse ways of living is worthy of 
examining as a crime against humanity, perhaps a crime against the Earth. 
Ecocide has recently started gaining more attention in green criminology and 
environmental humanities given the rising concern toward ecological crisis. Although earlier 
discussion on ecocide was in the scheme of war crimes,402 recent discussions center around 
ongoing settler colonial and postcolonial economic and geopolitical exploitation, extraction of 
resources, destruction of local subsistence living, and particularly that of indigenous people; such 
recent discussion seeks to establish ecocide as an international crime.403 Particularly, as Marin 
Crook and Damien Short suggest, the link between ecocide and genocide, which they call “the 
genocide-ecocide nexus,” is clarified by articulating ecological, cultural, and spiritual 
interrelationships that indigenous people have with their co-inhabitants and their habitat.404 That 
is, ecocide can be used “as a structural technique of genocide.”405  
For example, In “Environmental Genocide: Native Americans and Toxic Waste,” Daniel 
Brook argues that the continuous U.S. governmental and industrial practice of making many 
Native American reservations and the neighboring areas as the sites of (both legal and illegal) 
toxic waste dumps and heavy industrial mining is a form of ecologically induced genocide. He 
notes that this form of genocide is not “the result of a systematic plan with malicious intent to 
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exterminate Native Americans”406 but rather his analysis suggests that this is a modern colonial 
technique in which many existing forms of injustices such as material poverty, the high 
unemployment, environmental racism, and so on are combined to create a system of continued 
precarity.407  
Anthropogenic climate change can be another form of ecocide-genocide. For example, 
low-lying small island developing states (SIDS) like Tuvalu are under threat of “physical 
disappearance from the earth through inundation, or, at an earlier stage already, a state of 
inhabitability” due to the impact of climate change.408 According to Anja Kanngieser, in the case 
of Nauru, not only climate impact, but the military exploitation and destruction during the World 
War I and II by Japan and Australia, and both foreign and domestic corporation’s mining in the 
colonial and postcolonial resource extraction (which invokes the contamination of water and the 
food insecurity) are continuously hindering Nauru’s socioenvironmental ecosystem. Kanngieser 
argues that this continuous exploitation “is made feasible by the nation’s precariousness within a 
nexus of geopolitical and ecological violence.”409 In this sense, as Alexander Dunlap points out, 
“the genocide-ecocide nexus is a long-term, continuous and coercive process operating by 
various means and methods.”410 
As above examples show, ecocide can be a clear example of a crime against humanity, 
when we understand the interrelation between ecocide and genocide. This is a serious problem in 
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the light of plural politics, and we should take account of the nexus. Even Arendt would likely 
agree, as she also sees the importance of both earthly and world living for the politics of human 
plurality. However, we have to question whether ecocide only matters when it leads to genocide 
of human co-inhabitants. Understanding from a biocultural lens allows us to recognize that 
neither coinhabitants nor habitats are merely a background for humanity; these are irreducible 
and irreplaceable components of not only human plurality but also biocultural plurality. Putting 
this into direct perspective, I would ask, shouldn’t we also defend from and fight against ecocide 
for the sake of our numerous co-inhabitants and their/our habitats?411  
For example, in the Buffalo War, the settlers (the U.S. Army and hunters) intentionally 
slaughtered bison (buffalo) as “a means of bringing the Indians under their control.”412 Michael J. 
Caduto and Joseph Bruchac explain the war as follows: 
In the southern plains, the Comanches and Kiowas has joined together to fight the bison 
hunters and the U.S. Army. They tried to save the bison and their fight was called the 
Buffalo War. But they were outnumbered. Between 1872 and 1874, 4 million bison were 
killed on the southern plains. Of that number, less that 5 percent were killed by Native 
North Americans. The white people of Texas saw what was happening and asked General 
Sheridan to end the slaughter of the bison. His reply was, ‘Let them kill, skin and sell 
until the buffalo is exterminated.’ It was the first deliberate act of ecocide in our history. 
By 1875 all the bison were gone from the southern plains.413 
 
The fact the U.S. Army and the hunters knew that tribal people relied on bison for their 
livelihoods and committed the ecocide against the bison is a crime against humanity and can be 
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considered “as a final solution.”414 However, this ecocide of the bison itself is also heartbreaking. 
The ecocide of the bison does not merely mean a loss of sustenance for the people but also the 
loss of family members to the Comanche and Kiowa people. The Kiowa people’s story of the 
Buffalo War unfolds: 
Once, not long ago, the buffalo were everywhere. Wherever the people were, there were 
the buffalo. They loved the people and the people loved the buffalo. When the people 
killed a buffalo, they did with reverence. They gave thanks to the buffalo’s spirit. They 
used every part of the buffalo they killed . . . . Then the whites came . . . . They took the 
lands of the people. They built the railroad to cut the lands of the people in half. It made 
life hard for the people and so the buffalo fought the railroad. The buffalo tore up the 
railroad tracks. They chased away the cattle of the whites. The buffalo loved the people 
and tried to protect their way of life. So the army was sent to kill the buffalo. But even 
the soldiers could not hold the buffalo back. Then the army hired hunters. The hunters 
came and killed and killed. Soon the bones of the buffalo covered the land to the height 
of a tall man . . . .”415 
 
In this excerpt of the Kiowa people’s story, the bison fought back against the settlers to protect 
the Kiowa people. The bison are not depicted as passive beasts, but are active and caring 
members of the community. In this sense, this ecocide also means the mass murder of animal kin. 
The Kiowa people’s story mourns and grieves the death of bison, not merely as a loss of the 
Kiowa ways of life but as a loss of the loved members of the community.  
The resistance of the Oceti Sakowin and their allies, or Water Protectors as they call 
themselves, in the #NoDAPL movement at Standing Rock reminds us of this point about kinship. 
Water Protectors are not merely fighting against the corporate and colonial state violence to 
protect the Mini Sose, or the Missouri River, as a water resource. Craig Howe and Tyler Young 
note that the Lakota sense of relative includes all other-than-human beings and worlds, or the 
 
414 Caduto and Bruchac, “The Passing of the Buffalo,” p. 223. 
415 Ibid. 
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earth, thus “Standing Rock is where the people gathered in 2016 to protect their relative.”416 
Likewise, Nick Estes and Jaskiran Dhillion remind us that the Water Protectors recognize their 
kin relationship with water, as “the popular Lakotayapi assertion ‘Mini Wiconi’: water is life or 
more accurately, water is alive. You do not sell your relative, Water Protectors vow.”417 In this 
sense, as discussed earlier, the animacy of the world should be protected in itself; the Earth, 
water, land, and numerous other-than human species are not a background of humanity. Thus, 
ecocide should connote both as a crime against humanity and the Earth. Through using the term, 
crime against the Earth, I emphasize the point that the Earth is an integral part of the enabling 
and dynamic relations of all earthly inhabitants. 
Again, this whole point should not be seen as a conflicting interest to the right of 
marginalized populations of humans.418 We are all precarious and caught up in the web of 
interdependent relationships that includes other-than humans and the Earth. However, we need to 
recognize the unequal distribution of precarity (whose and what lives and ways of life are 
differentially protected by laws and institutions). As I explored through Butler, the question of 
which matters can be registered as political issues is never neutral nor equal, as Crook et al. say 
 
416 Craig Howe and Tyler Young, “Mnisose,” in Standing with Standing Rock: Voices from the #NoDAPL Movement, 
eds. Nick Estes and Jaskiran Dhillon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), p. 59. 
417 Nick Estes and Jaskiran Dhillion, “Introduction: The Black Snake, #NoDAPL, and the Rise of a People’s 
Movement,” in Standing with Standing Rock: Voices from the #NoDAPL Movement, eds. Nick Estes and Jaskiran 
Dhillon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), pp. 2–3. 
418 In her piece “Badass Indigenous Women Caretake Relations,” Kim TallBear makes an important point here why 
the way of thinking that human life needs to be prioritized over other-than-human entities is problematic. She says 
that “I suspect that hierarchical Western binaries that assert human needs as a priority—as somehow not always 
already intimately entangled with the fate of other-than-human communities—also taints some Indigenous thinking. 
The culture/nature or human/animal divide misses the point of the Oceti Sakowin and their allies at Standing Rock 
identifying themselves as “Water Protectors.” It is a fundamental misunderstanding of the core ethical framework 
that guides the Oceti Sakowin resistance to DAPL. The human beings gathered their stand with other-than-human 
relations—with the water, the land, and the many other nonhuman nations who reside within Oceti Sakowin historic 
lands—a place with which the Oceti Sakowin is coconstituted.” See Kim TallBear, “Badass Indigenous Women 
Caretake Relations: #Standingrock, #Idlenomore, #Blacklivematter,” in Standing with Standing Rock: Voices from 
the #NoDAPL Movement, eds. Nick Estes and Jaskiran Dhillon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 
pp. 16–17. 
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that “because the degree of attention paid to ecocide and genocide reflects the distribution and 
control of knowledge and power.”419 If there is some “human” job to do, then it is to broaden this 
narrow sphere of political space that prioritizes certain forms and ways of life over the others. 
When one million plant and animal species face a serious threat to extinction within a few 
decades,420 the question concerning living with others in the time of ecological crisis cannot 
ignore genocide, ecocide, and geocide. Arendt’s political philosophy of the love of the world 
needs to meet the love of the Earth for situated cohabitation.  
 
419 Crook, Short, and South, “Ecocide, Genocide, Capitalism, and Colonialism,” p. 300. 
420 See IPBES, Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, eds. Sandra Díaz et al. 
(Bonn, Germany: IPBES secretariat, 2019), pp. 1–56.  
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CHAPTER 5 
LIVING WITH OTHERS IN PRAXIS* 
5.1 Introduction: From Arendt to Education 
In the previous chapters, this dissertation has explored the meaning of living with others 
in the ecological crisis through a critical reading of Arendt along with Butler and Rozzi. In this 
chapter, I offer an example of situated cohabitation as a praxis: the Environmental Philosophy 
with Children (EPWC) summer camp project that was formed in 2019 in Texas. Before 
introducing the example in the following sections, I briefly address why education and children 
have something to do with situated cohabitation through conversation with and against Arendt.   
In “The Crisis of Education,” Arendt discusses the role of schooling in preparing the 
youth to take care of our common world. Her account of schooling is not about specific subjects 
or numbers of hours that children need to be at school. It is more about the teacher-and-student 
relationship, specifically the responsibility of adults to introduce the young to the world as it 
is.421 For example, in Arendt’s eyes, the desegregation of schools in the United States appeared 
to her as irresponsible act of adults toward children, because the children were left alone to 
figure out this racial turmoil by themselves, “burden[ing] children, black and white, with the 
working out of a problem which adults for generations have confessed themselves unable to 
solve.”422 After seeing a picture of a black girl, Elizabeth Eckford, being harassed by the angry 
white mob as a black student of the newly integrated school in Little Rock, Arkansas, Arendt 
 
* This chapter, specifically the sections between 5.2 and 5.6, has been previously published, either in part or in full, 
from Rika Tsuji and Benn Johnson, “Philosophy Meets Place: Creating an Environmental Philosophy Summer 
Camp,” in Growing up with Philosophy Camp: How Learning to Think Develops Friendship, Community, and a 
Sense of Self, ed. Claire Elise Katz, 99–109. (Lanham, Maryland, Rowman& Littlefield, 2020). This introduction, 
titled ‘Introduction: From Arendt to Education,” is added for this dissertation and is written solely by me. 
421 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, with an introduction by Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 185–186. 
422 Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” Dissent 6, no. 1 (1959): 50. 
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wrote the piece “Reflections on Little Rock” (1959) to show her objection to the desegregation 
of school, critiquing adults for prematurely exposing children to politics.423 For Arendt, adults 
should fulfill their responsibility to preserve childhood in the private realm and help introduce 
children into the world they are born into.424  
Besides her concern for the premature exposure of children into politics, Arendt’s 
objection to the desegregation of schools is also rooted in her understanding that school belongs 
to the social realm instead of the political realm. In her distinction, people in the social realm 
must have a right of free association, which allows people to choose whom they want to be with. 
In this sense, Arendt argues that the social realm is governed by the principle of discrimination; 
thus, she claims that the federal government should not interfere with whom the children want to 
attend school with.425  
On one hand, I agree with Arendt that we, adults, have a responsibility toward children 
and should not deprive them of childhood. However, in the case of the desegregation of school, 
as anti-segregation advocates and activists saw, removing the segregated racial barriers that were 
making black children feel inferior was necessary to protect the health and dignity of black 
children.426 In other words, the childhood of black children had been already hindered, or had 
been subjected to greater precarity, due to the racial segregation of the school. Although school 
can be a social space where children freely make choices to whom they would like to be friends 
with, school as an educational institution, without question, is more than social institution—it is 
a public institution where the value and practice of living with (unchosen) others is at stake.  
 
423 Maribel Morey, “Reassessing Hannah Arendt’s ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (1959),” Law, Culture, and the 
Humanities 10, no. 1: 88–96. 
424 Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” p. 50; Morey, “Reassessing Hannah Arendt’s ‘Reflections on Little 
Rock’ (1959),” pp. 90, 98–103, 106–10. 
425 Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” pp. 51–53.. 
426 Morey, “Reassessing Hannah Arendt’s ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (1959),” pp. 91–92, 104 ,109. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the politics of plurality makes a normative demand: we cannot 
chose with whom we cohabit on the earth. If school serves an important role for situated 
cohabitation, then enforcing the regulatory customs and norms of racial segregation and any 
other social and political discrimination at schools is intolerable in light of a politics of plurality. 
As Butler says, the distribution of precarity is never equal, and education, without exception, is 
often part of this inequality.  
For this reason, I disagree with Arendt’s assumption that we adults can control when and 
how children are exposed to political turmoil. For example, as discussed in previous chapters, 
ecological crisis is a political issue by and large. Then, what does it mean to preserve childhood 
in this planetary home? Greta Thunberg, a sixteen-year-old Swedish student, has made her voice 
heard in the world through the school strike for climate crisis and criticized the inaction of adults 
at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in 2019, saying “I should be back in school on 
the other side of the ocean . . . . How dare you! You have stolen my dreams and childhood with 
your empty words.”427 It may sound extreme, but the political inaction of adults, politicians, 
industries, and governments deprives children of a safe environment and planet where childhood 
can be secured. Our society has co-constituted the condition in which some children and youth 
have to act politically, as they come to be aware that there are no earth and world waiting for 
them to inhabit, despite the acknowledgement that this is not the primary job of childhood. 
Arguably, this is their performative concerted action, demanding that their lives, as well as the 
earth, are not disposable.428 As educators, we cannot pretend that children are protected from 
 
427 “Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech At the U.N. Climate Action Summit,” NPR online, September 23, 2019, 
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit. 
428 Like the global climate strike in September 2019, the world-wide children’s assemblies of School Strike for 
Climate have demanded for a livable earth and world for the people, and are a strong response to such injustice that 
has deemed certain populations as disposable. Of course, the children and the youth are not homogeneous; there are 
regional, economic, ethnic, racial, linguistic, and gender differences; there are varieties of reasons why they are 
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political issues; education and children are already politically entangled.429 
Like everyone else, children also bring something unexpected to the world through their 
natality. For Arendt, this is another reason why education serves an important role for our 
worldly living. For Arendt, this somewhat raw natality of children can be a threat to the world if 
children are left to understand what our world is on their own. As discussed in Chapter 3, Arendt 
understands the duality of our living: earthly and worldly living. We are born on the earth and 
live in the world. In this sense, education plays an important role particularly for worldly 
living,430  in that through education, we learn to live with others in the world, which proceeds 
and exceeds each of our arrival and departure.431 Arendt explains:  
Thus the child, the subject of education, has for the educator a double aspect: he is new in 
a world that is strange to him and he is in process of becoming . . .; it corresponds to a 
double relationship, the relationship to the world on the one hand and to life on the other. 
The child shares the state of becoming with all living beings; in respect to life and its 
development . . . . But the child is new only in relation to a world that was there before 
him, that will continue after his death, and in which he is to spend his life. If the child 
were not a newcomer in this human world but simply a not yet finished living creature, 
education would be just a function of life and would need to consist in nothing save that 
concern for the sustenance of life and that training and practice in living that all animals 
assume in respect to their young.”432 
 
 
joining together; and there are a variety of things they are demanding. For example, in New Zealand, one of the 
persistent chants was “we are not drowning, we’re fighting.” This chant reflects the experiences of people in the 
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That is, the world needs to be protected from the newcomers, children, while they are educated 
to live in the world. One of the reasons why Arendt wrote “the Crisis in Education,” is that 
Arendt perceives our society either misunderstanding or neglecting this double relationship. She 
questions whether we, adults, are serious enough to take care of the world, the only home for our 
plurality. For Arendt, this caring should include the care of children who are new to the world. I 
consider, in this sense, that education is her way of loving care and praxis of living with others in 
the world. She elaborates as follows: 
Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume 
responsibility for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except from 
renewal, except from the coming of the new and young, would be inevitable. And 
education, too, is where we decide whether we love our children enough not to expel 
them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands 
their chance of understanding something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare 
them in advances for the task of renewing a common world.”433 
 
Education, in this sense, is not a means of molding children into the expected ideals of 
the adults. Rather, education serves to help prepare children to take care of this world. However, 
as I discussed in the previous chapters, if we do not care for both earthly and worldly living—
situated cohabitation then we are at risk of increasing more alienation from the earth and world, 
or what Rozzi would call biocultural homogenization. In this sense, I consider that learning to 
live with others in place is important. What follows, thus provides an educational example of 
how the love of the world can be combined with love of the earth through the theme of place, in 
order to bring about a more situated cohabitation.   
5.2 Environmental Philosophy with Children Summer Camp 
Five children crowd around a hole in the base of an oak tree, searching for two beady 
eyes that peer back at the children. One student, with hands and knees pressed to the grey dirt, 
 
433 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 193. 
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excitedly motions to the group and asks, “Should we take him out?” 
One of the camp facilitators joins the conversation and queries, “Why do you think it is in 
there?”  
“Maybe he’s afraid! We should leave him alone,” a child speaks.  
Another child chimes in, “He could be our treasure! Let’s put him on the map!”  
The children, excited about the little frog that they have found (and left alone), make 
bright red Xs in their notebooks to represent their new treasure.  
Caring for others does not happen in a vacuum, nor does dialogue. Then how can the 
community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) encourage the specificity needed for care? This 
chapter attempts to show that place and environments are an integral part of learning to care for 
and engage in dialogue with the multitude of others with whom we share our communities. This 
chapter draws from the experiences of camp facilitators at an environmental philosophy with 
children (EPWC) summer camp and argues that “situated” inquiry can provide deep and 
immediate connection for children and facilitators and can be used to create more caring, critical, 
and creative communities.  
5.2.1 Creation of an Environmental Philosophy Summer Camp 
The inaugural EPWC summer camp (promoted as “Environmental Explorers Summer 
Camp”) was held from June 3 to 7, 2019, in North Texas, as a day camp that combined 
philosophical dialogue, art, and ecology, with the central theme of place.434 The summer camp 
 
434 The EPWC summer camp was funded by the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization (PLATO), the 
Onstead Institute, and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at the University of North Texas. The camp team 
sincerely appreciates the financial and institutional support from these institutions. We also would like to express 
deep gratitude to the rest of the camp facilitators—Shoshana McIntosh, Beatriz Galuban, T Wright, and Emily 
Hudson—for their hard work and care. We would like to extend our gratitude to our faculty team—Dr. Tyson Lewis, 
Dr. Tran Templeton, Dr. Chris Moffett, and Dr. Adam Briggle—for their strong support, including providing 
resources and supervision. The camp team greatly appreciates the collaborating institutions and their educators, 
Koan School, Lewisville Lake Environmental Learning Area (LLELA), and the Dallas Zoo for providing the camp 
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served twenty-four children, ages six through ten, with six university-student facilitators along 
with a small number of rotating on-site K–12 school teachers.435 Led by university students, the 
summer camp was an interdisciplinary collaboration among philosophers, artists, environmental 
conservationists, and local K–12 educators.  
The summer camp was developed from the ongoing project of EPWC at the University of 
North Texas (UNT).436 The authors of this chapter,437 along with help from the philosophy and 
religion department at UNT, began an exploratory expansion of Philosophy with Children (PwC) 
by integrating environmental philosophy with traditional PwC dialogues and named the project 
environmental philosophy with children (EPWC). In 2016, UNT students began weekly 
PwC/EPWC sessions with classes at a local nonprofit private school, which was looking to 
introduce philosophy to their students, ages four to eighteen years old.  
In 2018, with increasing interest from the K–12 school and UNT students and faculty, the 
EPWC project decided to create the first EPWC summer camp. By recruiting camp staff within 
the university, the team became a highly interdisciplinary collaboration. It comprised art 
education students and environmental philosophy students, along with art education, early 
childhood education, and philosophy faculty. Drawing from each of the members’ experiences, 
the team developed a five-day curriculum centered on “place,” in general, and the North Texas 
region, in particular.  
 
with in-depth resources and educational opportunities. Last but not least, the camp was made possible through each 
of the camper’s thoughtful participation and their parental support. We appreciate the chance to form a community 
of inquiry with these students. 
435 The camp employed three forms of groups: one big, two medium, and six small groups. Each small group had a 
group of four students and one facilitator. The camp divided the six small groups into two medium-sized groups 
based upon the campers’ ages. The younger medium group consists of twelve students aged six to seven, and the 
older one consists of twelve students aged eight to ten. The camp had discussion activities mostly in the medium-
sized groups.  
436 Per institutional review board (IRB; 19–289), all student names used in this chapter are pseudonyms.  
437 This original work is co-written by Rika Tsuji and Benn Johnson.  
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In Philosophy for Children (P4C) and/or PwC literature, the community of philosophical 
inquiry (CPI) is a central pedagogical practice in which children, along with a facilitator, are 
encouraged to think critically, creatively, and caringly through philosophical dialogue based 
upon a stimulus.438 Inspired by the CPI, the camp aimed to provide a safe, educational space for 
local children to engage in their place critically, creatively, and caringly through philosophical, 
sensorial, and artistic activities.  
Moreover, the camp drew from the p4c Hawai’i approach, which takes the caring aspect 
of the community of inquiry to be of utmost importance, signified in the program’s emphasis on 
what it calls “intellectual safety.” According to Thomas Jackson, founder of p4c Hawai’i, the 
community of inquiry requires that “new relationships place much more emphasis on listening, 
thoughtfulness, silence, care and respect for the thoughts of others” than in other educational 
environments.439 
Likewise, environmental philosophers such as Val Plumwood and Karen Warren have 
long noted the importance of care as a means of countering the environmentally destructive and 
patriarchal tendencies of much of Western ethics. Thus, not only was care set as a precursor to 
productive critical discussion, but it was also an end in itself within the camp. Many of the 
activities in the camp both required care for each other and called students to consider the means 
and objects of their own care. Care can be both a value and practice for situated cohabitation, 
being accountable for our social and ecological conditions of our interdependency and precarious 
existence. Care was thus not relegated to a hidden curriculum but played an explicit role in the 
 
438 Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Frederick S Oscanyan, Philosophy in the Classroom, 2nd ed. 
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camp, lingering heavily on the tongues and ears of both campers and staff.  
5.2.2 Creating a Place-Based Philosophy Summer Camp 
Place-based education is not a new, progressive model of education. As David 
Gruenewald and Gregory Smith say, “All education prior to the invention of the common school 
was placed-based.”440 However, as discussed by Ricardo Rozzi in Chapter 4, standardized 
education tends to ignore the lived (biocultural) experiences of students, teachers, and 
communities altogether in the pursuit of uniformity of knowledge and learning. Such education 
pretends to be from nowhere or aims to be for nowhere. Donna Haraway argues, however, that 
the acknowledgment of partiality in knowledge and learning is necessary for us to be accountable 
to each other, claiming that “the only way to find a larger vision [about communities] is to be 
somewhere in particular.”441  
Thus, in the development of the summer camp curriculum, facilitators were encouraged 
to take account of their place from ecological, sociopolitical, and historical perspectives. By 
doing so, the unequal distribution of precarity in our place could be recognized in our curriculum. 
For example, given that 43.4 percent of students in Denton are economically disadvantaged, the 
camp decided to offer full scholarships to those students in need.442 The theme of place also 
encouraged the camp team to reach out to local institutions. The summer camp collaborated with 
three different institutions: the local K–12 school, a natural conservation center, and a zoo.  
The central venue of the camp was the K–12 school, which is located on a suburban farm 
 
440 David A. Gruenewald and Gregory A. Smith, Place-Based Education in the Global Age: Local Diversity (New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), p. 1.  
441 Donna Haraway, “The Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 590.  
442 The percentage is as of October 11, 2019. See the detailed information about Denton ISD at 
https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/denton-isd/. The camp intended to offer eight need-based scholarships. 
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on the outskirts of Denton, Texas. The land on which Denton sits was formerly a mixture of 
blackland prairie and cross timber ecosystems, and it now represents an ever-expanding arm of 
the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex. The K–12 school is a partially developed plot, inhabited by 
grasses, mesquite and oak trees, various livestock (e.g., chickens, donkeys, and goats), sandboxes, 
playground equipment, and children.  
To help the children engage with their place, the camp facilitators took the children to 
two off-site locations. Lewisville Lake Environmental Learning Area (LLELA) is a local nature 
preserve that attempts to preserve native ecosystems of cross timber forest and blackland prairie 
that were once destroyed due to the development of urban settlements. Researchers at LLELA 
attempt to understand what has been lost or put at risk (such as box turtles and bison).  
The Dallas Zoo is an urban zoo, home to a diversity of mostly non-native species. Some 
of the animals at the zoo bring attention to their diminishing homeland habitats, making the key 
point that conservation is an urgent matter. At each site, the EPWC project tailored questions and 
lessons to those specific experiences so that campers could gain a more complex and dynamic 
sense of ecological community both in and out of North Texas. 
5.3 Exploring Maps Critically, Creatively, and Caringly 
To provide a coherent theme, it was decided that maps would be an ongoing element of 
the camp. Maps are philosophical and artistic ways of thinking about place, as they portray 
specific perspectives of one’s world. However, they are not always historically neutral tools. For 
example, Hannah Arendt describes the accidental “shrinkage of the globe” through abstract and 
reductive modern mapping, which made possible a possessive attitude toward the Earth.443 That 
is, maps reduce and exclude that which is considered extraneous, while including that which is 
 
443 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, 2nd ed., with an introduction by Margaret Canovan (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 250. 
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useful to the user. This process of inclusion and exclusion risks overly abstracting place, turning 
it into mere space.  
However, the same mapping process, when used critically, creatively, and caringly, can 
teach people about the places they care for (and don’t care enough about) and help people situate 
their concerns and themselves in particular places. During the camp, students created texture 
maps of the cross timber forest, looked at ecologists’ maps of native box turtles and a 
zookeepers’ electronic map of elephants within their enclosures, and created conceptual maps of 
the various links they had noticed and forged during the camp. 
At the beginning of the camp, the following question was posed: “What is a map for?” 
Next, campers were exposed to a variety of maps. The facilitators encouraged children to 
observe closely (including touching) the maps and explore what could be gleaned from them. 
Does this map describe what Texas is like? Can you find your own neighborhood on the map? 
What is missing in the map? Can everyone read this kind of map? The children shared their 
discoveries about the maps in the CPI. Some of them expressed that some maps oddly lack trees 
and animals.  
Most of the maps in the world are anthropocentric. People see things from their human 
sensory perspectives, and it is very difficult, if not impossible, for them to experience, as Thomas 
Nagel argues, for example, what it is like to be a bat.444 However, imagining nonhuman animals’ 
perspectives and understanding the limits of such imagination can help to form a basis for 
practical care for others. In the end, we cannot completely inhabit other people’s or nonhuman 
animals’ perspectives; however, this does not mean that we cannot acknowledge and recognize 
the presence of other embodied perspectives and conditions. As seen through Butler in Chapter 4, 
 
444 Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?,” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–50. 
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such recognition for the precarity of others is a condition for the politics of plurality.  
5.3.1 Painting Like a Turtle 
Thus, at LLELA, the camp introduced an activity called “Paint Like a Turtle,” in which 
children creatively explored how box turtles may experience their surroundings. They first 
learned about box turtles from a local conservationist and had a face-to-face encounter with 
young turtles that the conservationists were raising.  
Then, they hiked through the rehabilitated habitats to imagine places that the turtles may 
inhabit, what they eat, and what they see and enjoy while collecting (caringly) some materials 
from the trails for later projects. Along the trail, children stopped to draw and paint with 
watercolor pencils, given the task to imagine what it might be like to see from the turtle’s 
perspective. Some children painted only things that reside near the forest floor, while another 
spread forest soil on the paper.  
On the following day, the children reflected on their experience at LLELA and created 
texture maps using materials collected from the trail. Some of the children insisted on the 
importance of including soil and fallen leaves and grasses so that the box turtles can hide 
themselves from possible predators. The texture maps created by the children seemed to 
highlight the thoughtfulness of children toward their nonhuman co-inhabitants.  
Later in the day, the camp shared a children’s book called Melvin and the Boy,445 in 
which a boy brought a turtle, named Melvin, home from a pond because he wanted a pet. In the 
story, the boy realized that Melvin seemed unhappy, even though the boy provided the best care 
that he could. A facilitator paused the story there to ask the students what the boy should do next 
in the story.  
 
445 Lauren Castillo, Melvin and the Boy (New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2011). 
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Tonks, a nine-year-old camper, commented that the boy in the story should make more 
effort to ensure the turtle’s comfort, such as by including water in the turtle’s enclosure, 
suggesting the importance of replicating the turtle’s original habitat. Aspen, nine years old, 
responded, “I think the boy should release the turtle into the wild,” pointing out that the reaction 
of the turtle in the story suggests the turtle does not like the new home. Tonks pointed out that 
the release spot has to be the exact place the boy found the turtle. A facilitator asked, “Why does 
it have to be the exact place?” Scarlet, nine years old, responded that “the turtle may also have a 
family such as babies to take care of.”  
The facilitator asked, “Have you collected things from trails and school backyards so far 
in this camp?” Most of the students nodded. The facilitator continued, “Should we return things 
that we collected back to where we found them? Is our collecting activity caring? Is it different 
from collecting turtles?” Rachael, eight years old, suggested that the things the children collected 
were not alive, so it was fine to collect them, but people should not collect living things. Tonks 
responded that “If a bark has some fungi, and if there are many left, you can take some.” She 
also specified that “If it is a rock, then you need to make sure there is nothing living under it. 
Then, you can take it.” The community was able to inquire through their shared firsthand 
experience of collecting materials.  
Through attempting to see and inquire through the lens of their reptilian neighbors, the 
community of inquiry connected the materiality of the turtle with its unique perspective. 
Imagining another’s perspective requires one to take account of the other’s material conditions, 
such as habitat, body, and relations with others. By doing so, we can also realize the vulnerability 
of our ecosystems.  
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5.4 Bison: Placing the Past 
Bison were a normal part of much of the North Texas landscape before European 
colonization. Due to mass killings of the bison, particularly in the early 1870s, however, most 
children cannot see bison unless they visit special places such as natural reserve areas, where 
bison have been reintroduced. Thus, it can be difficult to imagine how the landscapes one 
currently resides in have been changed by forces such as colonialism. Bison were, for a long time, 
an integral aspect of the North Texas region, and they played a vital role in the daily lives of the 
tribes that made this place home.  
Unfortunately, the camp could not show the children bison firsthand but instead showed a 
brief video of bison that currently inhabit Caprock Canyon, a state park in the panhandle of 
Texas. After watching the video, children were asked to sketch the animals in the video. In the 
same morning, the camp had focused on the embodiment of animals and close observation 
through sketching and trying to move like the various farm animals that lived in the K–12 school.  
After sketching bison, the camp introduced a Kiowa story called “The Passing of the 
Buffalo”446 to groups of students. Following the tradition of Native Americans’ oral storytelling 
suggested by the book, a facilitator memorized the story beforehand and shared the story of the 
Kiowa people.  
As opposed to a predominant colonial version of the story in which buffalo were killed 
by the whites to free space for westward expansion, the story of the Kiowa people shares that 
buffalo were family members of the tribe and that the Kiowa people used to honor the spirit of 
the buffalo, during and after hunting, by using every part of the body. In this telling of the story, 
colonists built trains to separate the native peoples from each other, so the bison fought against 
 
446 Michael J. Caduto and Joseph Bruchac, “The Passing of the Buffalo,” in Keepers of the Animals, 223–44, 
(Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1997). 
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the trains and the army due to the buffalo’s love for the people. This telling of the story portrays 
bison as co-inhabitants of the plains that mutually care for the Kiowa people, contrary to much 
contemporary perception of nonhuman animals as lumbering, passive beasts.  
The story gave birth to a CPI dialogue overlooking a grassy pasture, currently absent of 
large mammals. Robert, seven years old, questioned: “If I have ancestors that were in the army, 
and the army killed the buffalo in order to get rid of the Native Americans, does that mean my 
family were the bad guys?” Harold, ten years old, commented that the buffalo did not go to 
heaven after they died, suggesting that the buffalo went to hell, doomed by the colonists’ violent 
crimes. A facilitator questioned, “Why is using the whole body of the buffalo caring?” Some 
students reflected over how they would feel if they were killed but left to waste or killed but 
appreciated through being used.  
After the discussions, the camp shared a digital map “Native Land,”447 which shows 
changes in territories, language boundaries in North America before and after the signing of 
treaties between native peoples and colonial powers such as the United States. As opposed to 
United States maps that show clear, usually geometric boundaries between states, as some 
students commented, the Native Land map includes many overlapping territories across different 
tribes. Tonks suggested that overlapping territories, as opposed to clear-cut U.S. states, may 
indicate that the different tribes might have been more willing to share things like food and water.  
Critical in this set of activities was the recognition that places are not simply spaces—
they have historical, political, and moral significance for many inhabitants, past and present. 
Through these exercises, the community of inquiry was able to expand its notion of what it 
means to care, the importance of the ways in which we are connected to land, and the uncanny 
 
447 The map can be accessed online at https://native-land.ca/ as of October 12, 2019. Please read further instructions 
for the use of the map at the site, where it is discussed in detail.  
120 
presences and absences felt when we inhabit particular places. 
5.5 Unexpected Unfoldings 
So far, this chapter has shared a few examples of planned activities during the camp. 
Educators spend significant time planning and theorizing in order to ensure that educational 
experiences are meaningful for all who are involved. However, in the actual camp setting, 
educational experiences are transformed from hypothetical curriculum to real interactions, and in 
these transformations, the actual experiences may completely change from the educator’s 
intentions.  
When hiking through the nature reserve, poison ivy became an unexpected highlight of 
the trip. After introducing poison ivy for the sake of keeping students safe, poison ivy was 
quickly transformed into a game; for example, we asked, “How many poison ivy plants can we 
spot on the trail?” Throughout the remaining days of camp, poison ivy became a common 
occurrence in student sketches and group discussions.  
Likewise, after hiking, some students and facilitators were bitten by chiggers, a common 
red mite that produces itchy, swollen welts. Although some of the students and faculty were 
previously unaware of these little insects, they served as a reminder that we are part of the food 
chain and as an exercise in patience (listening to peers can be very difficult when a student feels 
overwhelmed by itchiness). This experience also encouraged our community of inquiry to 
consider ways of coexisting with these insects without suffering their burning bites. As discussed 
through Butler and Rozzi in Chapter 4, this coinhabitation with “others” should always be 
subject to open inquiry; we must ask who/what are included and excluded from our field of 
recognition. 
Toward the end of the trip to the Dallas Zoo, the group was walking toward the exit of 
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the zoo, through an underground tunnel that had been transformed into a gallery of larger-than-
life images of various threatened and endangered species. This was not a planned “activity”; the 
camp staff was actually trying to leave the park quickly to arrive home in time for parent pick-up. 
Sophie, six years old, noticed that there was text next to each of the images and was struggling to 
read it. A camp facilitator that was nearby helped explain the text.  
“It says that they’re endangered or threatened, kind of like the bison that we talked 
about.” Sophie sighed thoughtfully. Just then, the group passed a similar image of a cheetah. 
Sophie gasped.  
“I love cheetahs! Are they going to be almost extinct, too?” 
“I’m not sure, but there are not a lot of them left.” 
“Why not?” 
What ensued during the walk was a meandering discussion between facilitator and 
student about human encroachment, climate change, and whether people in Denton were 
responsible for the endangerment of cheetahs. The student had previously mentioned that her 
grandmother lives in Africa and was particularly concerned with the connection between her 
own ways of living and the plight of a species that lives far from herself. While the subject of 
discussion was a non-native animal, the dialogue was situated in the actual relationships of the 
community and stemmed from the serendipity of location (i.e., stumbling across a provocative 
photograph in the middle of a zoo).  
In many cases during the camp, the spontaneous events led to shared memories of the 
place, as well as strengthened bonds between community members themselves. Although 
physical and intellectual safety are primary concerns, camp staff cannot entirely control or 
predict the educational environment or children (especially when outside of a classroom). 
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Although this can be challenging, certain unpredictability may afford a wealth of opportunity for 
a community of inquiry. As Arendt says, we cannot predict how we will be perceived by or 
impact others. Like everyone else, children bring this natality, ability to initiate anew, to the 
world. The natality of children is not necessarily all destructive, like Arendt is concerned of. It 
can be caring. By encouraging openness to some of this unpredictability, the place itself can 
become a participant to which the community must listen carefully in dialogue. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The reflections in this chapter represent only a few key experiences and not a complete 
picture of the summer camp. Furthermore, the argumentation is not intended to create a universal 
notion of how philosophy education or summer camps should be practiced. However, through 
sharing these experiences, the authors hope to encourage educators to consider place as an 
integral part of planning and practicing philosophy camp. Moreover, collaboration with other 
disciplines and institutions allows for an expansion of the ways in which the community engages, 
inquires, and expresses itself critically, creatively, and caringly in place. Through such situated 
inquiry and activities, students and educators can come to build caring communities that are 
much needed within the politics of plurality. 
5.7 Dissertational Conclusion 
Compared to the earlier chapters, this chapter may appear to be less theoretical, as it 
mostly reflects on the summer camp project where I (and Johnson and other camp facilitators) 
had many dialogues with our campers. However, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, my journey 
for this dissertation started from my dialogue with a student in Massachusetts who shared his 
concern of the earth becoming uninhabitable. Ending my dissertation with this chapter where our 
campers’ voices and thoughts are shared, thus, makes a lot of sense to me (hopefully to my 
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readers). As Arendt says, children’s natality, their ability to bring something new, is powerful. 
However, the summer camp example suggests that one way of serving our (adults’/educators’) 
responsibility is to help them know that their natality can be caring. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
ecological crisis consists of many forms of struggles, and some of these struggles may derive 
from the abstraction of place/land into a space, or earth alienation as Arendt describes it. My 
response to this, in this sense, is that introducing the newcomers to a place and sharing the ways 
in which we can care for our common place is both valuable and a praxis for situated 
cohabitation. 
Of course, this work is limited in many ways. However, as Arendt and others told us, the 
acceptance of limitedness, or partiality is important for my work to be accountable in the world 
of plurality. Conversing with Arendt has taught me her tremendous care for the world we share, 
and I would like to extend this care to the earth that we are always already bounded to.   
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